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THE SPANISH PRESS HAS LAUNCHED A NEW series of attacks on Britain, thus indicating the extent to which German successes outweigh London's efforts to appease with trade credits. Pressure is also being directed against Portugal, which is told it must choose between Spain and Britain. Such ominous signs point to the possibility that Hitler's next move, after he has cleaned up the Balkans, may be against the Iberian Peninsula. That is a step which, as W. E. Lucas explains on page 495, he has hitherto hesitated to take because it would make

Germany responsible for feeding Spain, already in the throes of famine, and would provide Britain with an opportunity to occupy the Azores, the Canaries, and the Cape Verde Islands. On the other hand, the conquest of Gibraltar would not only help to bottle up the British fleet in the Mediterranean but would also make possible German control of the whole of Northwest Africa. Two thousand more miles of coast bordering the Atlantic would be available for the use of German sea and air raiders, with corresponding hazards for British ships trading with both South Africa and South America. If Hitler is counting on finishing the war this summer by winning the Battle of the Atlantic, he can hardly fail to take over Spain and Portugal. Even though Portugal is a dictator state, it will scarcely welcome Nazi "protection," for it knows that the end result is likely to be its submergence in an Iberian empire ruled from Madrid—and Berlin. The Spanish government will offer no resistance, for it is in the hands of Hitler's devoted admirers, the Phalangists. They are obviously ready to adopt the Hungarian argument that, since German might cannot be withstood, it is sensible to cooperate with it and gain a scavenger's reward.

*

THE RENEWAL OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN Vichy and Berlin with the view of establishing a basis for "collaboration" is another pointer toward the probability of a German move into Spain. According to reports from Vichy, one of the conditions laid down by the Nazis is freedom to transport troops to the Spanish border through unoccupied France. On the other hand, it is said that the French government adheres to its refusal to allow Germany the use of the French fleet, which would be of immense value in protecting Spain against any counter-move by the British navy. However, the pressure being put on Vichy is increasing. The Nazi-controlled Paris press is staging another campaign against the "men of Vichy," and a new attempt is being made to secure the return of Laval as the only man who can be relied upon to place Franco-German relations on a satisfactory basis. It is said that the Nazis do not insist on his reinstatement in all the positions he held before, but Laval himself is reported to be demanding full direction of home and foreign affairs and the title of "chief of the government," now held by Marshal Pétain, who would become a truly decorative "head of the state" with no executive authority. There can be hardly any doubt that Laval, once installed, would give the Nazis anything they asked, but he would probably have to call in the German army to protect him, for he is a stench in the nostrils of the French people, who after ten months' experience are daily growing more belligerently anti-Nazi. Indeed, Laval is already said to be terrified of assassination, a fate which seems to have overtaken Jean Fontenoy, one of his leading aides.

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY ANTI-FASCIST refugees are reported to have been shot at Vernet, a concentration camp maintained by the Vichy government when they took part in a protest against Vichy's decision to extradite some of them to Germany and send others to do forced labor in Africa. At the same time comes a substantial rumor from Vichy itself that a special convention has been negotiated between Vichy and Madrid by which the Republican Spaniards still in France may be turned over to Franco. This is indicated by the fact that forty-five young French men and women who tried to pass through Spain to join the Free French forces were held in Figueras for several months and then sent back to France. The existence of such a convention would also explain why male Spaniards between the ages of seventeen and forty-eight are not permitted to apply for passage to Mexico. It would take a Euripedes to do justice to the tragedy which appears to have been enacted at Vernet, but even a State Department official ought to be capable of understanding that the Pétain regime, in turning over anti-fascists to Hitler and Franco, has sacrificed even claim to being called French or independent or human. Yet, so far as we know, Henry-Haye is still being recognized in Washington as the ambassador of a country rather than the representative of a prefecture of Berlin.

*

TUCKED AWAY IN THE APPROPRIATIONS BILL for the Department of Justice is a grant of \$100,000 to the FBI, "exclusively to investigate the employees of every department, agency, and independent establishment of the federal government who are members of subversive organizations or advocate the overthrow of the federal government." This provision could hardly be matched for reckless policy, vague definition, and bad English. As the American Civil Liberties Union pointed out, the Dies committee's frantic and futile attempts to find "reds" in the government is proof that such a sweeping, and expensive, inquiry would have no results except the disruption of morale. The provision would give to the FBI, which has too much power already, virtually the prerogatives of a political police. The vagueness of the wording makes the provision extremely dangerous. The appropriations bill, including this provision, has already passed the House. Inform your Senator that \$100,000 must not be wasted on such an inquisition.

*

THE "UNIVERSITY IN EXILE," WHICH WAS founded by Alvin Johnson in 1933, when the Third Reich was less than a year old, has just been granted a permanent charter by the University of the State of New York. Under the terms of the charter full academic powers are conferred on the New School of Social Research and the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, which is largely staffed by scholars of foreign birth and

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training. The event serves to remind us of the quality as well as the numbers of the great immigration which has taken place in the last eight years, not only from Germany but from other countries overrun by fascism. It also points up the fact that the United States is one of the few remaining sections of the world where free minds can function. That is a matter for pride but it also involves a great responsibility. Many Americans have yet to discover that the charter of freedom is never permanent, and in this respect, particularly, the émigrés of European culture have much to teach us, for they know what freedom is worth and what it costs.



"Never in Paris did I have such beautiful-fitting corsets," said a distinguished European visitor* the other day in our corset salon.

*She bought Saks own pantie girdle of power net and rayon satin lastex. \$12.50.

*She bought several Dorothy Bickum girdles of reinforced power net, white, tearose. \$18.50 each.

*She bought five of our exclusive duplications of a fine French corset in silk chiffon elastic with satin panels. \$59.50 each.

—Ad for Saks-Fifth Avenue

We have it on good authority that many of the distinguished Europeans still stranded in France for lack of money, influence, and visas are finding the German corset very trying; and there are said to be French refugees in New York who cannot even buy a meal, let alone a pantie girdle.

A Bill to Repeal the Wagner Act

THE Vinson bill, which has been approved by the House Naval Affairs Committee, is really a bill to repeal the Wagner Act. Under it, a fine of \$5,000 and a prison sentence of one year could be imposed on "either labor or management" which tried to bargain collectively in plants now open shop. By freezing the status quo in industry it would take from unorganized workers and unions not yet granted recognition the rights conferred on them by the National Labor Relations Act. It would encourage other employers now dealing with unions to break off relations with them, and it would weaken the right to strike by establishing a twenty-five-day "cooling-off" period after a strike vote had been taken. Mediation would be compulsory, and arbitration awards by the Mediation Commission would be enforceable by contempt proceedings.

Voluntary mediation under the present Mediation Commission has been successful from the standpoint of both labor and defense; it has, indeed, been so success-

ful in giving labor a square deal that there is a good deal of undercover grumbling against the commission in big-business circles. But experience with compulsory mediation in the last war, both here and abroad, indicates that attempts at coercion are more effective in causing strikes than in settling them. In Great Britain, during the last war, more than half a million munitions workers engaged in strikes after they had been declared illegal, and in this country the number of strikes rose by 20 per cent after mediation had been made compulsory.

The Vinson bill does not spring from a desire to settle labor disputes peacefully; it is an attempt to deprive labor of the added bargaining power given it in wartime by the increased demand for workers. From the standpoint of elementary economic justice and industrial efficiency, the place where curbs should be imposed is on the bargaining power of capital, not of labor. Donald M. Nelson, Director of Purchases for the OPM and Sears, Roebuck executive, declared recently that some defense industries "had been a little greedy." The financial pages of the press offer much evidence to support this opinion. At the same time Labor's Non-Partisan League declares: "A WPA study in fifty-nine cities shows that a manual worker with a family of two small children needs at least \$1,300 to \$1,500 a year for a bare maintenance budget, which would not provide even some of the simplest comforts. Yet two-thirds of the industrial workers earn less than this amount, according to pay-roll reports of employers." The economic argument is buttressed by an even stronger political argument, put with great eloquence by Federal Security Administrator Paul McNutt in his Jefferson-dinner speech before the National Democratic Club in New York. Mr. McNutt replied to hysteria about strikes and demands for the restriction of labor's rights by declaring that we can only save democracy by extending and improving it.

"A coalition of business men, military officials, and Congressmen," the *Wall Street Journal* reported frankly from Washington on April 17, "stirred up anti-strike legislation, pigeonholed the New Deal's federal oil-control bill, waived NLRB compliance as a requirement for defense contracts, and toned down the anti-trust case against the oil industry." Chairman Vinson of the House Naval Affairs Committee has been one of their principal tools. As Hatton Sumners's Judiciary Committee usurped the power of the House Commerce Committee on the wire-tapping bill, so the Naval Affairs Committee has usurped the power of the House Labor Committee on Vinson's bill to repeal the Wagner Act. Though the bill makes crucial changes in labor's rights, it was rushed through the committee after only two days of hearings and after only two witnesses had testified—Secretary Knox and John Green of the shipbuilding workers' union. Knox and Stimson have helped the bill along by their statements, and Knudsen, as in his speech before the

Academy of Political Science, has grown less and less restrained in his condemnation of labor, though he aided and abetted the three months' strike of capital last summer for special amortization privileges and repeal of profit limitations on defense contracts. It may be that Knudsen is speaking out more openly because he feels that the new powers given Harry Hopkins and Leon Henderson in the defense picture are limiting his authority. His function is to exercise his abilities as a production man on the blueprints of defense, not to act as a super-lobbyist for big business. In the former capacity, where his abilities are unquestioned, he could be most helpful. In the latter, he serves only to disaffect labor and undermine morale.

Will Japan Move South?

THE week that has passed since the signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact has brought only conflicting guesses as to its significance in terms of immediate Japanese policy. Some observers are certain that Japan will take advantage of the pact to launch its long-expected drive into the South Seas. Others seem equally confident that Japan has drawn a blank, and that it is in no better position than before to risk war with the United States. Still others look for an intensification of the campaign against China, while F. Tillman Durdin, probably the best-informed of the correspondents now in the Far East, predicts that Japan's first step will be an effort to conclude peace with Chiang Kai-shek.

In view of these conflicting interpretations, the interview with Toshio Shiratori, special adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, published elsewhere in this issue is worth careful reading. Mr. Shiratori speaks for the extremists who have largely controlled Japanese foreign policy in recent years. He is obviously attempting to make the American people see the logic of Japanese expansionist dreams.

Except for their unusual candor, Mr. Shiratori's remarks follow the pattern of other recent Japanese statements. They represent an effort to appeal to isolationist sentiment by alternating threats with visions of a Greater America which is to coexist with a Greater East Asia and a New Order in Europe. Completely absent, of course, is any intimation of Japan's grave weakness after four years of indecisive war with China. Nor is there any indication of dissent within Japan regarding the course which the extremists have marked out for the island empire. Yet these factors must be weighed, along with the dreams of the militarists, in any effort to anticipate Japan's next step. From a military point of view, Japan's position has been little, if at all, improved by the pact, especially as Soviet assistance to China seems likely to continue. In view of the uncertainties of the European war, Japan

will not dare to remove any considerable number of its troops from Manchuria. Nor has its shaky economic position been bettered. The United States still has it within its power to throttle Japan, militarily and economically, by imposing an iron-clad embargo on the export of oil, steel, and other essential war materials. Politically, the position of the Japanese extremists has been undermined by the free hand recently given to big business in dealing with the economic crisis. The business elements in Japan have always been inclined to be conciliatory toward the United States.

The special Cabinet meeting called to hear Mr. Matsuo's report suggests that despite the belligerent statements from Tokyo the basic decisions regarding Japanese action have not been made. Japan will probably confine its immediate efforts to strengthening its position in Thailand and Indo-China—a task which in any case would have to precede a drive on the main British and Dutch possessions in the South Seas.

The Price of Steel

THE steel industry has suffered two severe shocks in the past two weeks. The first was administered by one of its own leaders, E. T. Weir, chairman of the National Steel Corporation, who while negotiations for a wage increase were proceeding between United States Steel and the SWOC upped the rates of his own non-unionized workers by 10 cents an hour. This was exactly the extra amount which the SWOC was demanding, and after Weir's action any possibility of a compromise on a somewhat lower figure vanished. Not only United States Steel but all the other companies agreed fairly rapidly to pay the same increase. They did so with all the better grace because, with the demand for steel running away from supply, they imagined they would be able to compensate themselves through higher prices.

It was at this point that Leon Henderson, newly appointed Administrator of Prices and Civilian Supply, provided the second shock by issuing an order freezing steel quotations at their present level. The decision has evoked strong protests in the industry, and the Administration is being accused of encouraging wage advances while resisting price-raising, with the result that steel profits are being squeezed out of existence.

Before accepting this sad picture as a complete representation of the facts, it is well to consider the present financial position of the steel industry. Mr. Henderson's action, as he has explained, "should not be interpreted as fixing summarily a steel price ceiling for the duration of the emergency." It is intended, rather, to provide a "cooling-off period" during which a study can be made of steel prices and costs, "including wage increases, the significance of capacity operations, and the differences in

costs among producers." Meanwhile, as Mr. Henderson has pointed out, the fact that basic prices have not been altered since the defense program was launched does not mean that receipts per ton have been the same. Various concessions have disappeared, charges for extras have been increased, and in some cases premiums have been obtained for early deliveries.

The most important fact with regard to steel, however, is that the huge increase in output, which stems directly from the government's defense spending, has drastically cut the costs of steel production, especially in the case of the big integrated companies which control some 80 per cent of the total output. According to the *Wall Street Journal* of February 5, 1941, nine leading concerns averaged \$3.28 per ton profit in 1940 compared with \$1.63 in 1939, in spite of a heavy increase in taxation. Again, United States Steel raised its output from 60.7 per cent of capacity in 1939 to 80.2 per cent in 1940, and its profits rose 150 per cent. The same company has estimated that the new increase in wages will cost it about \$62 million per annum, and since its total profits for 1940 were about \$102 million, it might appear that earnings would be cut sharply. However, U. S. Steel has been operating since the beginning of the current year at almost 100 per cent of capacity, and there is every reason to suppose that this rate will be maintained at least into 1942. As a result fixed charges will be spread over a much larger total tonnage and net earnings will very probably be maintained despite the larger wage bill.

Another point to be taken into consideration is that a part of the additional cost of labor will be offset by savings in taxes. As the invaluable *Wall Street Journal* pointed out on April 17: "Most if not all of the big steel producers are currently earning at a rate putting them well into the excess-profits tax brackets. Of every dollar of earnings in the top brackets 62 cents goes to the tax collector. Thus so long as the wage increases do not cut profits below the excess-profits tax credit, the cost of the advances, so far as the stockholders are concerned, is only about 38 per cent of the amount by which wages are boosted."

Taking such considerations into account, it seems probable that the big steel concerns, which control the whole process from raw material to the finished product, may be able to absorb the increase in wages and still retain handsome profits. But the position of the smaller producers must also be taken into account, since every ton of steel which can be delivered from the furnaces is now required. Such producers have to buy ore and scrap in the open market; they do not enjoy economies obtained from very large-scale operations—for instance, in pig-iron manufacture—and in many cases they are working with older and less efficient plant. It may be that some of these concerns will find their margins of profit wiped out by increased labor and other costs. But a rise in steel

prices sufficient to bring them a reasonable return would mean pure gravy for the big fellows, and would raise the costs of every industry using steel to the detriment of the government and of civilian consumption.

Mr. Henderson must decide, therefore, the best method of keeping the small concerns in production. It would certainly be cheaper for the government to subsidize them than allow a rise in prices, or it might prove advisable for the government to lease their plants for a fixed charge for the duration of the emergency. But the first thing to be done is to ascertain the exact status of costs and profits in the steel industry, and the meaning of Mr. Henderson's freezing order is that the steel companies must open their books and prove their case before their plea for higher prices is given consideration.

The Balkan Scramble

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

AS THE German forces push southward through the Greek mountain passes, plowing their dead into the earth as they move, the New Order begins to take shape behind them. Hitler spent his birthday discussing the disposition of the conquered lands, and solemn dispatches from Berlin reported progress in drawing up plans for Balkan "reconstruction." But we need not wait for the final blueprints; Hitler's basic purpose is already clear. The New Order in Eastern Europe is to be calculated chaos.

Pretty soon the map drawn at Versailles will begin to look like the work of disinterested and inspired statesmen rather than of conquerors concerned chiefly to safeguard their own position. The nations that were set up in 1919 on the ruins of old empires were at least roughly adjusted to national aspiration and ethnic realities. Under Hitler's plan each fragmentary group is evidently being prepared for a future of vendetta and guerrilla warfare against its neighbor, with Germany standing by as both agent provocateur and umpire. This system is hardly calculated to provide Hitler with the fruits of peace; but he is doubtless ready to sacrifice a certain percentage of production to the larger necessity of keeping his feudal estates weak and at odds with one another.

The Rumanian War Minister has called upon his helpless country to wipe out the "bitter traces" of its losses in 1940. Concretely this means that the present government is supporting agitation for the return of Rumanian territory turned over to Hungary by Hitler last winter. But Hungary, taking advantage of the general dissolution, plans to demand or take more of Transylvania from Rumania as well as a part of the Banat—claimed by Rumania—from Yugoslavia. The corpse of Yugoslavia obviously offers the best pickings to the Balkan vultures. Bulgaria, having surrendered to Hitler without a fight

and even joined in the attack on northern Greece, has already put in its bid for a slice: Bulgarian troops are now occupying several areas in Macedonia and Thrace. The new state of Croatia, torn out of the side of Yugoslavia, is apparently destined for "independence" under Nazi control. What prizes the triumphant Italian Fascists will win, besides the Albanian lands reconquered by Hitler, no one can yet say. They are laying claim to Dalmatia, "which is Roman and Venetian," and to Montenegro, a tough little principality which can be counted upon to cause trouble to any nation that annexes it. But whatever Mussolini gets will be in the nature of a hand-out, and Hitler will certainly assure himself outlets to the Adriatic before he takes care of his diminished Axis partner. The final slicing-up of Yugoslavia will await the end of the war in Greece. But enough has happened to provide a picture of the New Order in process of organization. France, whose turn may come next, should watch the Balkan scramble with interest.

Meanwhile the Allied retreat in Greece continues. The whole effort of the defending forces is obviously concentrated on making the Nazis pay as high a price as possible—in men and material and time—for every mile gained. And this object is apparently being accomplished; Hitler is not getting his Balkan victory for nothing. But wars are not won by minor defensive successes. Already a possible withdrawal of the British forces is being discussed in the press here and in England. Some experts are convinced that the maximum military advantage of the Greek resistance in Greece will soon have been realized and that the strategic value of a timely evacuation would offset its political ill effects.

I have before me a memorandum prepared for *The Nation* by the eminent military expert, Herbert Rosinski, which arrived too late to be printed in full in this issue. Its timeliness is so apparent that I want to summarize it briefly here. In all his lectures and writings Dr. Rosinski has pointed out the danger of basing optimistic hopes on superficial minor successes. The present situation in Greece, he believes, should have been expected and discounted in advance. At no time was there reason to believe that the Yugoslavs could hold out against the vast superiority, in numbers and equipment, of Hitler's mechanized divisions. While the British and Greek forces, better prepared and supported by Britain's naval power, have a chance of at least maintaining a foothold on the peninsula, he doubts the wisdom of an attempt to do so.

Britain, Dr. Rosinski believes, moved its forces into Greece for compelling political reasons. Today, for equally compelling military reasons, Britain must consider the advisability of taking them out. "However painful it may be," he says, "the arguments for such a move from a purely strategic point of view are almost overwhelming. On the great strategic map of the war this

core of Greece forms an isolated bastion which may indeed serve to hold up the Nazi advance for a while longer but in itself possesses no appreciable value either for defense or for a possible counter-offensive at a later stage. Its flanking position toward a German advance through Asia Minor is in its turn heavily discounted by Italian control of the Dodecanese; while the chances of successful bombing operations against the Rumanian oil wells from its air fields are conceded to be very small. In contrast, the British position in North Africa forms one of the main pillars of the whole Allied strategy, the fall of which would entail the most serious consequences, not only for the Near East, but for the whole conduct of the war. Now that the German drive across Libya has rapidly developed into a serious menace, the re-concentration in North Africa of all forces, including the bulk of the British armored forces at present in Greece, has become a vital military necessity.

"Thus the question of evacuation leads back to the dilemma before which the Allies found themselves placed from the beginning of this campaign: whether for moral reasons to expose themselves to the possibility of a military disaster which might engulf with the best part of their forces the whole of their power of resistance in the Near East, or, by refusing to let themselves be drawn into that trap, to furnish Hitler the opportunity of denouncing their failure to support their allies."

The Nazi drive in North Africa has during the past week bogged down; and when a *Blitzkrieg* loses its *Blitz* it may find difficulty in recovering momentum. If the British move sufficient forces from Greece to Egypt they may succeed in permanently checking the German advance toward the Suez Canal. But by the same act, as Dr. Rosinski points out, they will help Hitler wage the psychological war through which he unceasingly attempts to impose the fiction that all the troubles of the non-belligerent nations arise from their susceptibility to British instigations and their reliance on British promises. Today this idea is rammed home through German war communiqués which praise the heroic resistance of the Greeks while at the same time insinuating that British forces "are nowhere to be seen" or "are already looking around for the nearest port of embarkation."

These maneuvers, in Dr. Rosinski's opinion, are preparations for a new and heavy peace offensive to be launched at the end of the Balkan campaign. With Britain thrown—or frightened—off the Continent and the superiority of German arms finally demonstrated, Hitler will ask, "What possible hope of a come-back can the Allies entertain; what interest, above all, can the American people have in such a hopeless cause?" The fact that this argument is based on a series of military fallacies does not lessen its danger. But it is a danger that Britain must reckon with in making the crucial political and military decisions of the coming days.

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Pipe Lines and Profits

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, April 20

THE hope that the Russo-Japanese pact does not mean Soviet abandonment of China is growing dimmer here, and this would be the psychological moment for the Administration to make Morgenthau and Jesse Jones stop piddling and fiddling over that \$100,000,000 they promised the Chinese last fall. It would also be the psychological moment for an embargo on all oil shipments to Japan. The Chinese need a shot in the arm badly, and their continued resistance is as important to us in the East as Britain's is in the West. Prudential's belly-crawling assurances yesterday to Hitler and its scarcely veiled invitation to the Japanese to help themselves to "vulnerable spots" in the East signal serious trouble ahead. I am informed in the Department of Commerce that our oil exports to Japan are still averaging about 400,000 barrels a week, and have been as high as 600,000 barrels. This includes crude oil for Japan's refineries, fuel oil for its navy, low-grade aviation gas, motor fuel for mechanized vehicles, and lubricating oils of all kinds. Since the oil companies are always asking for our intervention in their behalf in Latin America, since we helped them muscle in on the Near East fields after the last war, and since we may have to defend the Dutch East Indies, an embargo ought to apply to shipments from American oil-company properties anywhere—in the Dutch West Indies as well as the Dutch East Indies, on the Persian Gulf as well as the Gulf of Mexico. A government too flabby to keep its oil companies from fueling our enemies is too flabby to fight a successful war.

Rancid is the word for the contrast between the unwillingness of the oil companies to make this contribution to the security of their country and the many favors they continue to ask and receive here in the name of national defense. The State Department is making a fatted calf of Camacho in preparation for the return of our prodigal oil companies to Mexico. We have placed a Rockefeller in charge of promoting our Good Neighbor policy, and he has the help of a Chase National Bank executive in passing on Export-Import Bank loans to Latin America. Chase National, based on Standard Oil millions, is well known for neighborliness in Latin America, particularly in Cuba, where it financed a man named Machado. It and the oil dollar-a-year men could easily prove criticism unjust by exerting their influence to stop oil shipments to Japan. Some of them have been using their influence to obtain some extraordinary letters

in behalf of their companies from Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Stimson, and Mr. Knox. There is no good reason why this influence shouldn't work both ways.

So far the only embargo for which the oil trust's dollar-a-year men have been plugging is an embargo on Thurman Arnold. Thurman Arnold, like Senator O'Mahoney, derives ultimately from the oil state of Wyoming, and the oil companies aren't accustomed to back talk from that area. The Senator is so well house-broken that he didn't even mention the oil monopoly in the final report of his monopoly inquiry, a spectacle to make history gape. Arnold, though unpredictable, has backbone, and he started out last fall to use both the Sherman Act and the Elkins Act against the pipe lines. Control of transportation is as much the heart of the oil monopoly today as it was when Henry Demarest Lloyd wrote "Wealth Versus Commonwealth." The pipe lines are supposed to be common carriers; the oil monopoly has kept them private thoroughfares. The first move made by the oil companies was to obtain a report from the National Defense Commission, prepared by Leon Henderson, hinting that defense would be impaired if Arnold were permitted to demand divorcement of the pipe lines. The report said the companies would not build certain pipe lines badly needed for defense if he went ahead with this part of his anti-trust suit. When I asked where these pipe lines were to be built I was told that was a military secret. I then obtained possession of this military secret for 15 cents by buying a copy of the annual pipe-line number of the *Oil and Gas Journal*, which contained a map showing all existing pipe lines and the two proposed new ones referred to in the report.

One was to be built from Port St. Joe, Florida, to Chattanooga by Pure Oil (Dawes interests) and Gulf (Melson). The other, from Baton Rouge to Portsmouth, was the competitive answer of Standard of New Jersey and Shell interests, which didn't propose to be put at a disadvantage in the Southeastern marketing area. The promoters of the first line ran into a snag and asked the legislature of Georgia for the right to acquire property by condemnation. The companies obtained a letter from the President saying this was needed for national defense, but on March 19 the legislature, though intensely pro-Roosevelt, refused the request, and the companies are now about to ask Congress for a law giving them the right of eminent domain in Georgia. The Cole committee, which since 1933 has spent about \$500,000 investigating oil without ever doing much about it, was

chosen as the oil-company forum. On January 24 Rear Admiral H. A. Stuart, director of naval petroleum reserves, had written Congressman John M. Coffey of Washington that the proposed pipe line was "a purely private enterprise" for the importation into the Southeast of "imported refined petroleum products, probably from Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, etc. . . . and so far as I am aware would not be of any service to the navy." Admiral Stuart was forced to eat his words. On the witness stand before the Cole committee he was confronted with a letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox declaring that this pipe line was required for defense. Major Clifford V. Morgan, oil expert in the office of the Under Secretary of War, who also failed to see any connection between this pipe line and defense, was similarly confronted with a letter to the contrary from Secretary of War Stimson. The railroads and the brotherhoods claim that with 9,000 tank cars a day idle and a shortage of steel the defense argument really runs the other way. Congressman Lea elicited the information at the Cole committee's hearing that the Baton Rouge-Portsmouth

line alone would require enough steel to build three 35,000-ton battleships.

Curiously enough, this is the moment at which the liberals on the ICC have finally prevailed upon their colleagues to exercise, for the first time, the power given them by Congress thirty-seven years ago to regulate pipe lines. An order has been issued reducing crude-oil pipeline rates to an 8 per cent return (they have been averaging 25 per cent), and another order reduces the rates of two Midwestern gasoline pipe lines to a miserly 20 per cent (they have been averaging 30 per cent). No doubt the companies will use this as an additional argument for softening up the consent decree they are now negotiating behind the scenes with Thurman Arnold. Thus the ICC, like Providence, moves in mysterious ways. The joker is that very few independents can get to the pipe lines anyway. So long as we permit integrated companies to control the flow of oil from the well to the service-station pump, a reduction in the rates they charge themselves for the use of their own pipe lines merely forces them to put less in one pocket and more in another.

Tokyo—Moscow—Berlin

BY ROBERT W. BARNETT

ON March 15, two days after Foreign Minister Matsuoka's departure for Moscow, Berlin, and Rome, I asked and was granted an interview with Toshio Shiratori, special adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office and one of Mr. Matsuoka's principal aides. Mr. Shiratori, formerly Japan's ambassador to Italy, is a strong advocate of Japanese cooperation with the Rome-Berlin Axis and was an influential architect in the construction of Japan's present policies—domestically, the New Structure; internationally, the New Order in Greater East Asia. The orientation for which Mr. Shiratori speaks entails explicit opposition to the vested interests of Anglo-American capitalism, and in the course of an earlier interview, on September 26, 1940, he had made his position on this score clear to the point of bluntness. When I cited Japanese opinion in Shanghai to the effect that a Japanese-American war would be a supreme tragedy, Mr. Shiratori replied, "It may be a tragedy but it is a necessity—an inevitability."

Between my two interviews with Mr. Shiratori much had happened. General Tatekawa had found his efforts to conclude a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression agreement apparently fruitless. The Gaimusho, or Foreign Office, had watched with little satisfaction the reelection of President Roosevelt, acceleration of the American rearmament effort, and the passage of the Lend-Lease bill.

It had observed, too, the unbending resistance to German air attacks offered by the British people and the Royal Air Force, the Italian reverses in North Africa and in Albania, and Bulgaria's adherence to the Axis. Units of the American navy were cruising off the coast of New Zealand when Matsuoka embarked upon a mission of state that was to culminate in the treaty with the Soviet Union. It was clearly a strategic time to check on the gains and losses to date and to inquire about trends for the future.

What, I asked Mr. Shiratori, have been the concrete gains which Japan has already achieved through adherence to the Tripartite Alliance? "It has been stated frequently," Mr. Shiratori began, "that Japan has nothing, Germany everything, to gain from the alliance." This judgment, he conceded, has a large measure of truth if one looks at Europe alone. In Europe Germany's opponents are Great Britain and the United States. Germany has no navy; Japan has. Japan is therefore a potential aid to Germany's war plans. Furthermore, he went on, it is said that in the East Japan cannot be assisted by Germany, indeed, has no need of German support, and one is asked why Japan therefore has not remained alone? Japan has not remained alone because after Great Britain and the United States are shut out of Europe, as is bound to be

the case, Germany will take care of its ability beyond Japan.

The events continued in Asia, pending. Greater Japan by Germany. United States a European would control continent. America offered peace at its hands, its empire by its policy oligarchy acceptable. It was clear that the entire compelled control of The Axis Europe.

It was explained, pact with continued genuinely objective own mis New Order Pax Britannica as a war.

Mr. Shiratori that Germany answer, China from any attention in the United States had helped insisted that mercies of where he that Germany's stance by

I suggest future, that Italy has in turn,

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the case apparently, these two powers will then be prompted to attack Japan. If Japan stayed aloof now, Germany and Italy would be entitled to let it take care of itself later. Their own hands would in all probability be full, and they would have no desire to assist Japan.

The essence of the Tripartite Alliance, Mr. Shiratori continued, is that the new orders, both in Europe and in Asia, must be bound together and made interdependent. Hence, as Japan fights for the New Order in Greater East Asia it is helped by the war being waged by Germany and Italy against Great Britain and the United States. At one time the war in Europe was merely a European affair, and the prospect was that Hitler would confine his interest and his energies to the Continent. After the downfall of France, indeed, Hitler offered peace to Great Britain on condition that it keep its hands off Europe and restrict itself to maintaining its empire overseas. Had the British Empire been ruled by its people, Mr. Shiratori suggested, and not by an oligarchy, such an arrangement would have been quite acceptable. But Great Britain rejected this offer, making it clear that Germany must continue the struggle against the entire Anglo-Saxon world. Germany is therefore compelled to wage war until it breaks Anglo-Saxon control not only in Europe but throughout the world. The Axis must defeat Great Britain in Asia as well as in Europe.

It was recognition of this prospect, Mr. Shiratori explained, that made Hitler realize the necessity of a pact with Japan. Japan accepted the offer of a pact, he continued, because it felt that if Germany and Italy were genuinely determined to defeat Great Britain, such an objective had a very clear and intimate relation to Japan's own mission in East Asia. The Japanese realize that the New Order in Greater East Asia is incompatible with a Pax Britannica. Japan regards the China war in essence as a war waged against British rule in China.

Mr. Shiratori next turned his attention to the charge that Germany has not afforded Japan much help. The answer, in his view, is simply that Japan has fought China for three and a half years without material help from any source. I interrupted him at this point to draw attention to the fact that the Chinese and many observers in the United States believed that American aid to Japan had helped to support its war effort. Mr. Shiratori insisted that Japan had fought alone "despite the tender mercies of the United States" and had reached the point where help from any quarter was welcome. He reiterated that Germany had actually contributed invaluable assistance by fighting for the New Order in Europe.

I suggested to Mr. Shiratori that were Germany, in the future, to find itself in the military position to which Italy has been reduced in recent months, Japan might, in turn, face a different situation.

"We cannot say which side will win," he replied, "but we know which ought to win—must win—and which to help. That should be enough." In any event, he continued, the pact made no difference; Japan would be in the same position without it if Germany were to suffer reverses. After the last World War Japan, an ally of the democracies, found that its designs were frustrated by obstacles created by the democratic powers. These powers, in recent years, he argued, had continued to pursue the same course, long before the pact was concluded. In the China campaign and elsewhere Japan had encountered American criticism and opposition. Indeed, British and American hostility

to Japan during the China war, according to Mr. Shiratori, was solely responsible for Japan's adherence to the Axis.

"For many months," I remarked, "but especially since September, 1940, it has been a commonplace to declare that Japan and the United States belong to clearly opposed camps. Both Japanese and American observers are inclined to attribute to each other a large measure of bluff in the conduct of these increasingly strained relations. Who, in your opinion, is the real bluffer and wherein lies his pretense?"

Mr. Shiratori laughed at this manner of approaching the question, but began answering me by saying that Japan and the United States have been in different camps ever since the Treaty of Portsmouth. In 1914 it was mere accident that accounted for Japan's support of the Allies. The World War, he said, opened the eyes of both Italy and Japan. Both countries readily admit the gravity of the mistake they made. As to which country was the biggest bluffer, Mr. Shiratori solemnly asserted that so far as Japan was concerned there was no element of bluff in anything it undertook. This, he said, has been amply demonstrated in the China war. The rulers of the United States, he went on, are already deeply involved in Europe and in Asia. To them the issue of war in Europe and Asia is a matter of life or death. Wall Street and America's financial interests feel that the war is their war, and they cannot afford to let Germany and Japan win. As to whether or not Germany and Japan would be able to defeat the United States, Mr. Shiratori would not hazard a guess, but, he added, not every war is bound to produce decided victors. There can be wars in which



Tosio Shiratori

all parties are winners or all parties losers. In the last World War all major parties were losers; he expected this one to produce only winners.

Mr. Shiratori said that it was only common sense to view the post-war world as one made up of several autarchies. The American autarchy would have at its disposal the vast natural resources of North and South America. What more, Mr. Shiratori inquired, could it desire? Americans could stay at home, and the masses would greatly benefit from a decision to let Asia alone. The Japanese autarchy would include Greater East Asia. Japan would set its house in order and leave the rest of the world alone. What territories, in exact terms, would be included in Greater East Asia Mr. Shiratori did not make clear, but he maintained that Japan's purpose was not so much economic as humanitarian. Wherever Asiatics were enslaved they must be released. So far as economic resources were concerned, the Asiatics in Southeast Asia would be glad to share resources which other parts of the world do not possess, but they do not wish to be under the rule of imperialistic nations.

In addition to the American and Japanese autarchies, Mr. Shiratori informed me, there would be a Soviet autarchy, which would probably include a large part of British India. Turkey's future position he found difficult to foresee, except that the country could not of course remain independent. It might be included in the Soviet group or in the European group. The European autarchy, under German dominance, would include the European and African continents, but even so it would be the one most lacking in material resources.

When I asked Mr. Shiratori if Europe's deficiencies might not contain the seeds of conflict between Japan and Germany, he said such a conflict was now difficult to foresee. It has been a great mistake, he insisted, to attribute to Hitler designs to conquer the world. "I think that the American public has been led to believe in the existence of dangers which in fact are non-existent. That is, they are told to fear the danger of aggression from Europe or from Asia. Europe's concern is only to be left alone. If the United States has a real interest in the fate of England, then the United States should realize that it possesses enough territory to invite all Anglo-Saxon peoples to reside there."

As for Australia, Mr. Shiratori expressed the opinion that since its inhabitants were white Japan had no claim upon it and would be very glad to live at peace with it.

At this point I asked Mr. Shiratori what was the particular purpose at the bottom of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's trip to Europe. He expressed the belief that the mission had no definite object further than to make personal contact with Hitler and Mussolini and to compare notes with them. "Will Matsuoka attempt," I asked, "to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union in the

course of this journey?" Mr. Shiratori said that this was not impossible. Japan had always attempted to bring about better relations with the Soviet Union. Germany and Russia were at present on good terms. It is possible, he added, that Germany would use its good offices to assist Japan in this object. I asked if a Japanese-Soviet agreement was not, in fact, a prerequisite for a wholly satisfactory implementation of Japan's designs in the south. Mr. Shiratori said that he did not believe that was. He saw no reason why Japan and the Soviet Union should clash in any event. The Soviet Union, he believed, wished to remain neutral to the end of the current world conflict. Of course, if it found Japan completely helpless it might not remain idle. Therefore Japan wished, in advance, to make agreements with all countries which do not stand in its way. If the United States would remain neutral and speed Japan in its southward march, Japan would be only too glad. I asked Mr. Shiratori bluntly if Japan would regard a Japanese-Soviet agreement as a go-ahead signal for the southward push. Mr. Shiratori said that he could not speak for the Russians, but he saw no reason why the Soviet Union should seek to check Japan in its program of southward expansion. Russia might even hope for the acceleration of that program, he suggested, since this might bring about Japanese-American hostilities. Should this occur, the whole world would be at war, with only the Soviet Union aloof and neutral.

I suggested that Japanese statesmen must surely have made plans for dealing with China in connection with their southward expansion and asked Mr. Shiratori what, at present, were the prospects of bringing to an end the "China incident." He replied quickly that the Japanese regarded the Chinese war as practically finished. The supreme object of Japan's China campaign was already or would soon be attained—that is, the establishment of China's independence from harmful exploitation by imperialistic peoples, especially Great Britain. Mr. Shiratori said that it was amply clear that Sir Victor Sassoon was at the bottom of the China war. So long as Britishers were guilty of sinister manipulations, Japan and China could find no lasting peace. China, he said, would swiftly confiscate foreign properties in Shanghai. His own government, he told me, had already promised the Chinese to abandon Japan's special rights there. This promise, however, would not be made good until other peoples had been forced to give up their privileges. Shanghai, in this regard, has a unique importance. All decent people, said Mr. Shiratori, consider Shanghai a hell on earth—a veritable city of vice. Who made it so? The British. This wicked element must be driven away—at the point of the bayonet if necessary. The operation would be very simple. I asked Mr. Shiratori if the operation would take place before or after the establishment of the New Order in Greater East Asia. He evaded my

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question but asserted that the existence of Shanghai would certainly be wholly incompatible with the New Order when it was established. What objectionable activities the Japanese themselves have carried on in China, he said, had been learned from teachers from the West,

who had influenced liberal and capitalist elements within his country. Japan at present feels that it must cure that unfortunate aspect of the situation at home. If the rule of Tenno is really achieved within Japan, Mr. Shiratori concluded, Japan's problems elsewhere will be solved.

Hitler Eyes Portugal

BY W. E. LUCAS

WHATEVER may be happening in the Balkans or in the Libyan Desert, one thing is certain: the Atlantic is the main theater of this war.

Only there can a speedy collapse of Great Britain be forced. Without a quick victory in the Atlantic Germany will have to face a long war and the one peril which it really fears, the steadily growing pressure of sea power and of American material aid to the Allies.

It is in the light of the Battle of the Atlantic that the present campaign in the Balkans and the Axis drive to the Egyptian border must be viewed. The Balkan campaign, if the Germans are successful, will not only threaten British supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean but clear the way for a future advance into the granary of the Ukraine and the oil fields of the Caucasus. These will be necessary steps for Hitler if he is unable to obtain a victory in the Atlantic this summer. The attack on Egypt is directed not only against the Suez Canal but against the whole of the North African coast as far south as Dakar. The further the British can be pushed back from the Tunisian border, the greater the pressure that can be brought to bear on an isolated General Weygand to bend him to the will of Berlin. It can be said that the Nazi advance in Libya is made with a backward glance toward the Atlantic seaboard and that one of its main objects is to strengthen the Axis position on the Western Ocean.

These preliminary moves in the extension of the Battle of the Atlantic automatically bring the Iberian Peninsula into the strategic picture. In this major plan Portugal, jutting far out toward the west, holds obvious prizes for the Germans. It has two fine harbors in Lisbon and Oporto. Madeira and the Azores are stepping-stones to the American continent. The Cape Verde Islands and the Portuguese colonies in Africa pierce the Allied control of the African continent south of the Equator. From the airports of Cintra and Espinho long-range bombers could roam within hailing distance of the Western Hemisphere. From Lagos in the south the skies above the Straits of Gibraltar could be closely patrolled. Against these advantages the physical difficulties of an occupation of Portugal are few. Perhaps less than any other small

European state could this country offer resistance to the advance of Nazi mechanized troops, coming through Spain.

Portugal's independence has been seriously threatened ever since the Nazi legions arrived in the Pyrenees. It was a matter for wonder then that Hitler did not order his armies to roll on into Spain and, fanning out, to occupy Gibraltar and Lisbon. There was nothing at that time to stop them. The neutrality policy adopted by Salazar in October, 1939, could not of itself have prevented his country from becoming the center of a tug-of-war by the contending forces. But it seemed that an independent Portugal had its uses for Hitler. Lisbon was the last remaining outlet from Europe to the world beyond. Through it passed Nazi agents and material for propaganda in South America and the United States. At the Cintra airport great four-engined Lufthansa passenger planes landed daily, together with smaller Italian and Spanish aircraft. They brought in not only men but goods of small bulk and high value. Some of this remained in Portugal; much was carried by Italian planes or ships to South America and gained for the Nazis needed foreign exchange. From Portugal itself raw materials could be acquired in limited quantities and shipped over the Spanish border. Lisbon was one of the few leaks in the British blockade through which, by devious methods, essential fats could be sent into Germany. At the same time the Nazis were making their dispositions for the possible taking over of the country. To these Axis activities the British replied with counter-measures and attempts to win the Portuguese government to a firmer belief in the possibilities of an Allied victory.

In the meantime Salazar was using every means at his disposal to keep the German threat at arm's length and to prevent the economic strangulation of his country by the British blockade. Obviously Portugal's last line of defense is the Pyrenees. Only so long as Nazi troops can be kept on the northern slopes of those mountains can the country maintain its independence. The key to the situation lies in Spain, and it has been to bolster General Franco's resistance to Hitler pressure that Salazar has worked ever since the early months of 1940.

So far this policy of close cooperation with Spain has brought results. Through an agreement with the British the majority of the food that is imported into Spain comes from Portugal and its colonies. The British let it through the blockade, and payment for it is made in sterling against the Anglo-Spanish clearing arrangement. Incidentally this is a profitable business for the Portuguese since it enables them to sell some of their colonial products and at the same time



Dr. Salazar

gives them valuable sterling credits. Another recent commercial treaty with Spain has stimulated trade between the two countries and, together with a pact of mutual assistance, has drawn them into a closer union. But these safeguards will be effective only while food remains the most important factor in the Spanish situation. It is the scarcity of food in

Spain that enables Salazar to exert his decisive influence on the war policy of Franco—against participation.

On the other side of the Portuguese balance sheet are the economic difficulties of the Portuguese state. Salazar has worked for twelve years to build a solid financial and economic foundation for his New State. But the dislocation of world trade resulting from the war has interrupted most of the commerce of the Portuguese colonies, which before 1939 found their biggest market in Central Europe. The friendly agreement between Britain and Portugal has done something to mitigate the situation, but nothing can divert the inexorable forces that are crippling the country at the very beginning of its experiment in "national regeneration."

There is a sharp cleavage of opinion among the people. The great majority by tradition and sympathy are pro-Ally. At the same time, as is only natural in a dictator regime, there are many groups, both within and without the government, which derive their inspiration from the ideologies of the totalitarian states. Most Portuguese are undoubtedly behind Salazar, but there is less widespread support for the regime as a whole. This conflict of thought and feeling within the country has naturally produced strains that lessen the political strength of the state.

When all is said and done, the fate of Portugal must depend upon factors over which Salazar has no control. Its future stand in the war will depend upon the strategic demands of the Axis powers, that is, upon

Hitler's calculation of the profit and loss that would follow an occupation of the Iberian Peninsula. From the example of the Balkan countries it might seem that he would find the swallowing of Spain and Portugal a simple and inexpensive matter. But there exist certain conditions in this part of Europe that must make the Nazis hesitate. In the first place there is the question of food. Already, without German occupation, 20,000,000 Spaniards are on the verge of starvation. Portugal, though almost self-supporting, offers nothing of real consequence in either food or raw materials. Moreover, occupation would immediately bring about the complete blockade of the Peninsula and thus reduce the people to actual starvation. Hitler would then face the alternative of allowing 25,000,000 people to starve or feeding them himself. The latter choice would put a heavy strain upon the German transport facilities and at the same time drain the limited food supplies which Germany has stored for itself and the rest of occupied Europe. Even if these difficulties could be overcome, it is doubtful that Hitler could spare so much fuel for a non-essential military object.

Great Britain's reaction to the occupation of Portugal would certainly be the seizure of the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, and possibly Madeira as well. And British possession of these invaluable strategic positions for the Battle of the Atlantic would largely offset the advantages which the seizure of the French ports of Casablanca and Dakar would bring to the Germans.

Apart from these two major considerations the Nazis must question the advisability of increasing by another thousand miles the coast line which they will be forced to defend against British naval attack. The shape of things to come has been glimpsed in the recent raids on the Norwegian coast and the constant landings, small but persistent, on the shores of France. If the British can withstand both the siege and the invasion of their island fortress during this year, by 1942, with a growing parity in the air, the whole of Europe's eastern seaboard will be a battlefield immensely difficult to defend. And in the background looms the shadow of the United States, which is being compelled to push farther afield the frontiers it must defend for its own safety.

These, then, are the questions which Hitler must face before he can make any decision that will affect the independence of Portugal. If he is convinced that occupation is to his advantage he will move into the Iberian Peninsula in spite of the risks involved. His next step depends in large measure upon the success of the present campaigns in the Balkans and in Libya. If these two regions can be cleared up, then it will be possible for him to develop his strategy on the southern Atlantic seaboard by way of the North African coast, without having to disturb the hornets' nest of difficulties that lies along the path through Spain and Portugal.

Eviction by Machinery

BY DALE KRAMER

ALITTLE more than a month and a half ago, on March 1, the date when most leases expire, thousands of American farmers had to leave their homes because the technology of agriculture today made it impossible for them to compete with their neighbors. They had been squeezed out, evicted by the power machine, and many of them left the land for good.

The trend is manifest today in all agricultural areas. What happens is simple. A farmer—say, a small operator in Iowa—owned his property until the insurance company foreclosed on his mortgage in the early thirties. From then on he managed only fairly well, for his equipment was not especially good and his credit was impaired by the foreclosure. His neighbors meanwhile had succeeded in equipping themselves with the new power machinery, which cut their production time almost in half. It is true that one of them had to mortgage his farm in order to purchase the new implements, but at any rate he had them.

In the past few years the neighbors of the man who had to surrender his property to the insurance company have found their farms altogether too small. With little added time and expense each could cultivate another forty to eighty acres, perhaps more. The one who had to mortgage his property to buy the equipment feels that it is absolutely essential that he get additional land to enable him to meet principal and interest. The insurance company is naturally eager to secure the highest rent possible for the foreclosed farm. Having had little paint or repair, the buildings on it are not of great value. But the farmer next door has no use for the buildings, and he offers simply to rent the parcel of land at a price equal to or higher than that paid by the present lessee.

The farmer threatened by this squeeze resists for a year or two, accepting an additional rent load and putting in longer hours. But in the end he bows to the inevitable. He shops around for another farm, but there is none to be had. In the past the evicted farmer purchased a feed-grinder, hay-baler, or equipment of some kind with the proceeds of his closing-out sale, moved to a nearby village, and tried to pick up a living by custom jobs. But the field has long been overcrowded. Demand for farm labor is anything but heavy except for a few weeks in the busy seasons, and even if an opportunity came along the evicted man would hesitate to accept it because his social status would be hurt. Eventually he may be forced to endure the reduction in status, but he will want to hide his shame by migrating to another part

of the country. Another possibility for him is to acquire a subsistence patch somewhere; or he may follow the road to the city and, in time, to the relief rolls.

This process, familiar in farm areas throughout the country, is relatively direct and simple. Perhaps in more cases the fences are merely uprooted after the death or retirement of a farm operator. Yet the result is the same: a section of the agricultural population is displaced. In the South the reduction from small owner or share-cropper to field hand, and from field hand to vagrancy, can happen very quickly.

For some time the sweep of technological advances has worried the men whose job it is to see into the future of agriculture, and, lately, the talk in farm homes has turned more and more to the subject. Now comes the United States Department of Agriculture's survey of the problem (a 224-page report titled "Technology on the Farm"). If it offers no solution, it at least gives a view of the problem as a whole, and makes it possible to measure in some degree the impact of the changes on the whole rural population.

Nowadays the farmer rides to the field on a speedy pneumatic-tired tractor. Where he used to follow afoot a single plow drawn by a team of horses or mules, several plows now follow him. Disking, harrowing, and planting are greatly facilitated not only by improvements in the implements themselves but also by the tractor's greater speed. It is therefore not surprising that the number of tractors in use doubled between 1930 and 1940, and that a further increase is predicted. About 60 per cent of all farms large enough to make practical use of tractors already have them—about 90 per cent of the farms in the wheat and corn belts and the specialized dairy, truck, and orchard areas of the East and Far West.

It is in harvesting machinery that the most recent and startling technological gains have been made. The big combine, cutting and threshing at the same time, which, in the 1920's began to eliminate the great crews that once followed the wheat harvest, was succeeded in 1935 by the "baby" combine, and in 1939 by the "midget." Now the great crews which used to follow the wheat harvest have all disappeared, and along with them that engaging feature of the old Midwestern harvest season—the neighborly threshing ring with its gargantuan dinners.

The invention a few years ago of a mechanical cotton picker, foreshadowing the displacement of hundreds of thousands of small owners, share-croppers, and field hands, perhaps more than anything else called attention

to the farm technological problem. But the picker has not yet been perfected and consequently its impact on human lives has so far not been seriously felt. On the other hand, the mechanical corn-harvester works efficiently, and the rapidity of its adoption during the past year or two has been phenomenal. Corn-husking used to be something of an art, and probably will remain one as long as the annual contests held throughout the Middle West retain their popularity. But a relatively small percentage of next autumn's crop will ring against the tall sideboards of the wagons. Instead, machines which look like giant worms will rumble quickly down the rows behind tractors, sucking the yellow ears from their husks. A good hand picker does well to harvest an acre a day; in the same time the mechanical picker harvests seven or eight acres with ease.

Other factors facilitating production are improvement in plant and animal stocks and headway in the fight on the insects and diseases which beset them. The situation is pointed up ironically by Henry Wallace's role in the development of hybrid corn while, as Secretary of Agriculture, he had to deal with overproduction. Hybrid seed steps up production five to six bushels an acre, or from 15 to 20 per cent. It is now used on 24,000,000 acres, or one-fourth of the total acreage planted to corn, with an estimated increase in yield of 100,000,000 bushels and with probably another 120,000,000 bushels in sight.

Almost all other plants have been improved, though the result has been less dramatic than in the case of corn. The cotton staple has been lengthened, and new types of wheat, oats, sugar beets, and soy beans have been introduced. The average farmer has also become a scientist in animal breeding and care.

The effect of all this on the national farm community can be summarized roughly as follows: (1) The larger, better-equipped, better-financed farmers benefit by the advance of technology ("To him who hath shall it be given"). (2) Poorer farmers migrate to the cities, shift to subsistence patches, or live somehow by odd jobs or by government relief ("and from him who hath not it shall be taken away"). (3) Young men find it increasingly hard to become farm operators.

The first point has already been partially illustrated by the account of the farmer who acquires a few score additional acres but has no intention of expanding further. Conditions favor to an even greater degree what Midwesterners call "corporation farmers"—the plantation owners of the South and the large fruit and vegetable growers of the Far West. The possibilities for the big owner can be judged from the survey's conclusion that in the South about four families are displaced by each tractor. The rate is not so high in other crop areas, or where custom and stiffer resistance by the population make it more difficult to throw fields together. But the opportunity is plain.

Landless farmers may, as the second point indicates, accept odd jobs, but the fact is that on the farms today there are at least 1,500,000 men—more than half of them under thirty-five years of age—either totally unemployed or unable to get work except in the busy seasons. Naturally wages have been forced far down. (Agricultural workers are not covered by wage-and-hour legislation.) Even the medium farmer who heretofore kept a hired hand finds it possible, with power machinery, to handle his work alone except during harvest, and then he can get all the help he wants for a dollar a day, or less.

The surplus of farmers and the shrinking of tillage land are partly responsible for the increased difficulties of the young man who wants to become a farm operator. Technology adds another handicap, as does the increase in capital outlay necessary to begin. In 1900 a young man wishing to start on an average scale needed only \$3,000—the figure does not include land—and most of that he could borrow. The sum required had risen to \$8,000 by 1930, and today he could hardly expect to get along with less than \$15,000 in cash and credit. Since no farm laborer can hope to save anything like this sum out of his wages, only those blessed by inheritance can hope to become operators.

It is true that other than technological factors have contributed to the situation. For one thing, country boys used to find work more readily in the cities than they do now. In 1929, for example, 2,081,000 farm persons migrated to the city and 1,604,000 returned, leaving a net loss to the farm of 477,000. The ratio in 1939 was 1,063,000 to 805,000, or a loss to the farm of only 258,000. This loss would be beneficial still, except that the farm birth rate is high. Each year 400,000 men reach maturity on the land, but only 110,000 die and perhaps an equal number retire. As a result, the farm population in 1940 was 32,245,000 as compared with 30,220,000 in 1929, and by 1950 it will probably have increased by another 2,000,000.

Mechanization itself, the agricultural economists believe, will force from 350,000 to 500,000 farm operators and workers from their occupations during the next decade. The figure seems extremely conservative. The development and widespread use of the mechanical cotton picker, or of some other machine not yet on the horizon, could double or triple the figure. It is therefore conceivable that ten years hence 3,000,000 men will be living on the land with no opportunity to till it, while hundreds of thousands of others will have migrated to city relief rolls, and many more to subsistence patches.

Five days after he took office in 1933, President Roosevelt called a conference of farmers to map agricultural legislation. Three weeks ago the President, Vice-President Wallace, and Secretary of Agriculture Wickard delivered radio addresses commemorating that occasion.

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Most of the speakers pointed with pride to the New Deal's achievements. National farm income had been reduced by half during the Hoover Administration. Under the New Deal it was raised from \$5,409,000,000 in 1933 to a probable \$8,500,000,000 in 1940 (the exact figure has not yet been computed). There were other gains: the rehabilitation of thousands of farm families by the Farm Security Administration by means of loans and grants, the refinancing of mortgages by the Federal Land Bank, seed and feed loans to farmers in drought areas, loans to cooperatives, rural electrification, and the disposal of surplus products, to name the major services.

Some 2,000,000 farmers gathered at banquets throughout the land to hear the enthusiastic reports of the speakers, but for all that, dissatisfaction among the agricultural population seems to be increasing. The loss of the farm belt by the New Deal testifies in some degree to that fact. More recently farm organizations have made a strong fight for increased aid. The Senate Agricultural Committee shows an inclination to support them. Recently it unanimously approved the Bankhead bill to increase loans on the five basic crops—cotton, tobacco, corn, wheat, and rice—in an effort to add an additional \$1,000,000,000 to farm income. Advocates of increased aid point out that income is still about \$2,000,000,000 below the 1929 level.

Exactly what steps, if any, the Administration will take is not clear. The writers of the Department of Agriculture's survey freely admit their inability to see a solution to the agricultural problem as long as the economic system is organized the way it is now, though they do suggest such alleviating measures as a conservation works program, the extension of the Farm Security Administration's activities, rural housing projects, and the like. But expenditure of new sums on agriculture, even if the President should desire it—and it appears that he does not—will meet with increasing opposition; only the other day the *New York Times* called for the end of even present benefit payments, and its chief columnist, Arthur Krock, is conducting a campaign against the relatively high corn loans which put a "floor" under the market.

Meanwhile, with surpluses piled up, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration has asked farmers for larger acreage cuts, and is conducting elections among corn and wheat farmers for authority to inaugurate selling quotas. A quota would be allotted to each farmer, whether a cooperator with the AAA or not, should a two-thirds affirmative vote be secured. It is a step repugnant to agricultural officials, and it aims only at maintaining the present income levels, rather than at raising them.

The war may increase agricultural income if Mr. Roosevelt decides to send large supplies of food to England. But the present large stocks are in good part the

result of the loss of foreign markets. Moreover, the desire for friendship with South American countries provides an argument for less competition with their farm products in the small foreign market which remains. Induction of young men into the armed forces may temporarily reduce the surplus of farm labor, but it has been shown that any real shortage only hastens the adoption of labor-saving machines. Thus a prolonged conflict might prevent immediate worsening of the situation, or even provide a slight shot in the arm, but afterward the problem would be accentuated.

The stock answer is, of course: provide the underprivileged of the nation with an adequate diet and the farm problem will solve itself. There is nothing wrong with the answer. The farm and city cooperatives are endeavoring to eliminate the barriers to exchange of farm and manufactured goods, but progress is necessarily slow. The authors of the Department of Agriculture's survey, the heads of its various divisions, lay the blame squarely on industry, declaring that the agricultural problem cannot be solved without drastic reorganization of the industrial system, a conclusion which appears judiciously arrived at from the facts.

Lord Halifax on a Horse

BY CARL SANDBURG

MAN, according to one philosopher, is a forked radish in bifurcated garments. To a child asking what this means we might answer, "Man is a vegetable who walks around, wears pants, and tries to look important." This of course would not cover the case of the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, riding in a private car with his entourage from Washington to Philadelphia. Then, as though it might help win the war, Lord Halifax gets up on a horse and rides in a fox hunt, and is photographed for the press, and gives out the word that he is fox-hunting in the United States about the same as he fox-hunts in England.

All this is the right and prerogative of His Lordship. But I wish he wouldn't mix up fox-hunting with his talk about fighting the war for democracy and freedom. This Anglican scholar is lean, earnest, serious, even solemn, having an ascetic face. He means well now, just as he meant well when he lifted no finger to avert the four-power Munich Pact of 1938. He is in a class now that believes we can have democracy and fox hunts on horseback while fighting a desperate war with an incalculable adversary. Lord Halifax climbed aboard the hurricane deck of his fox-hunting horse and rode as blandly as though it were not happening over a wide region of Europe and Asia that horse meat has become precious and large populations on meatless days wish

they could have horse steak, horse pot roast, or soup with rich horse stock as the basis. I am not sure at all that Lord Halifax has for a moment contemplated the possibility that before Britain's ordeal is over, the population, as at Vicksburg in 1863, may have slaughtered its last horse for food. I hope and pray this will not happen. Also I hope and pray that the fox-hunting class of Britain will have less and less to say about the future of England.

Some of us are trying to get a national-defense apparatus going in this country. Some of us are taking chances in the hope that national unity may be perfected and the word democracy given deeper and surer meanings in human opportunity and security. It will help a little if the British Ambassador will enjoy horses but keep away from fox hunts, a leisure-class sport that arose out of the need for what Veblen termed "conspicuous waste" and "conspicuous leisure." Lord Lothian, his predecessor, wouldn't have done it. Also Lothian would have ridden in a Pullman compartment, knowing that a private car would not frame him right.

We well understand, in degree, Lord Halifax's reasons for giving no statement as to British war aims. While doing so we wish His Lordship could in return understand that there are American workingmen who ask, "Are we going to war again for the sake of a lot of English fox-hunters?"

I stood the other night at the highlighted big gates of the United States Steel works in Gary. Long lines of men on the night shifts were coming to work. Each had a paper sack in one hand—the snack of food he would eat near daylight to carry him through till past sunrise, when he would go to a house or a furnished room to sleep and prepare for the next night, when again he would become one of the hundreds of silhouettes winding toward the steel-mill gates with a paper sack in his hand. I thought for a moment of how Lord Halifax would have considered it ridiculous for him to ride up to those mill gates and be seen by those steel hands as he sat astraddle the fox-hunting horse near midnight. Yet many of those men had seen the pictures and news stories about him. He is to them just another English lord. He does not know that with the national-defense effort now making, it is important for him to try to understand the night-shift Man with the Paper Sack. He will find that the Man with the Paper Sack likes horses, enjoys pitching horseshoes, bets on horse races, loves Man o' War, adores the cowboy on a wild broncho, and slants a suspicious cocked eye at any English gentleman in a scarlet coat riding with other gentlemen on a Sunday morning, all on horseback, hell-bent after one little fox born and bred to be hunted. It's not un-American or subversive. It is merely indicative of the fraction of the British embassy which lives in the past and hopes the future will be the same.

In the Wind

A SENATE COMMITTEE recently learned that Standard Oil tankers were delivering oil to Teneriffe Island for German and Italian use. Asked about this policy, E. B. Lyman, Standard Oil publicity director, replied: "First of all you must understand that we are an international company, and we must keep an international viewpoint. . . . As a general rule we sell to anyone who wants to buy and can pay for it."

THE MAKERS of Absorbine, Jr., the liniment that made a fortune as a nostrum for "athlete's foot," will no longer advertise their product as a complete cure for that ailment. The Federal Trade Commission secured a stipulation to that effect from the company after pointing out that Absorbine Jr., rarely reaches the infected tissues.

A JEW reading the *Völkischer Beobachter* on a park bench in Berlin had the paper torn from his hands by a Nazi policeman. The Jew was asked why he read a German paper and not a Jewish one. "My own paper," he replied, "tells such gloomy stories about the Jews—thousands penniless and hopeless everywhere—that I like to read Herr Hitler's paper, which tells of rich and powerful international Jewish bankers, great Jewish scientists whose books are burned, and famous Jewish politicians. Their names cannot be mentioned in my paper, and to get news of my people I must read the Nazi papers."

WILLIAM ALLEN WHITE was invited by a group of liberals to join them in asking the President to intervene in behalf of the striking Ford workers. In his telegram of acceptance White suggested that the groups go after conservatives instead of appealing only to "left-wingers like myself."

CLEMENT ATTLEE recently proposed to the Executive Committee of the British Labor Party that no Labor M. P. be allowed to vote against or criticize government measures. The committee voted down the proposal but passed a resolution that Labor representatives, while allowed to criticize any government measure, may be called to account before party chiefs if they vote against the party's stand.

CLASS ANGLES, from the *Daily Worker* of April 15: "Most of the pap that comes over the radio is a far cry from Bach and Beethoven. In fact, the monopolists who rule the ether waves only sandwich in the classics to draw attention to the rabid warmongering which assails the listeners' ear-drums." . . . "President Roosevelt [at the opening of the baseball season in Washington] took time off from hurling the country into war to throw out the first ball."

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

A Native at Large

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

Defense Problem No. 1

THOSE Southern Governors who went to the White House recently asking for defense contracts for the South somehow succeeded in making themselves seem like salesmen seeking their share. They should not have seemed so. What they put before the President when they came up from the land which he lovingly described as Economic Problem No. 1 was the same South. Now that South is becoming increasingly Defense Problem No. 1 in the democratic defense of a land which must be strong altogether if it is to be as strong as it should be anywhere.

The South is where the people are increasing—particularly the young people, whom the President called the keystone of the arch of defense. Indeed, in the same week in which he called them that in connection with draft-registration day, census figures were announced which showed that there were fewer young people in America than there had been ten years before. Only in the South was there more of the youth essential to defense. The democracy they defend will be behind them there.

Consider it. Their agriculture is declining. Three-fourths of the exports of the cotton from which 60 per cent of the Southern people derive their living has been cut off by the war. The big British buyers have neither the money nor the ships with which to take American tobacco. But there were, according to Milo Perkins, a million more people on the cotton farms of the South at the beginning of this war in Europe than there were when the first World War began. In addition, the decline in the number of tenants—due to more machines and bigger farms—means that in the Southern states at least 200,000 ex-tenant families now lack even that precarious relationship with the land. The greatest labor pool in America waits and hopes for work in the South. Much of it is good labor, strong labor, capable of acquiring any skills. It is ready for any kind of work; minimum wages sound silly in a country where 11,000,000 people are members of families with cash incomes of around \$250 a year.

But defense spending has not stirred the creation of industrial jobs in the South, where so many jobs are needed by people pushed from the crowded land. Not many people outside the South paid much attention to Chester Davis when, as a member of the Defense Ad-

visory Commission, he spoke about it. Davis said that of the total defense contracts let between June 1, 1940, and January 31, 1941, only 7 per cent went to eleven Southern states which in 1937 produced 11 per cent of the total value of the nation's manufactures. More important, perhaps, he said that of orders let between June 13, 1940, and February 15, 1941, 80 per cent had gone to sixty-two companies of interrelated groups of companies. Not many of them were in the South.

The country which produces the country's youth, as the census showed, is caught between the pressures of an agriculture declining in terms of the people it requires and can (or will) feed, and an industry which Mr. Davis declared was not receiving its share of the defense spending. Undoubtedly, the spending as placed may make possible the quickest deliveries. It may put the work into the hands of people who already possess the skills—though training schools are working all night long in the most crowded industrial cities. Generals and admirals and dollar-a-year men may question Mr. Davis's feeling that such concentrated spending creates a "serious bottleneck in the full use of our industrial and human resources." What cannot be doubted is that, between the two pressures in a defended democracy, what the President once called Economic Problem No. 1 is becoming an even more difficult regional problem as defense spending proceeds.

I am a Southerner and perhaps, therefore, prejudiced. I definitely am not trying to make any secret about the fact that as Southerner I am disturbed. But I am not sure that this Southern situation is Southern. It means at the very least the acceleration of the migrant story in the whole country. It means the continuation of poor nutrition, poor schools, poor housing now in the region from which the largest part of the youth of the nation will come later. It might mean now not only an industry concentrated in contracts to big companies but an industry concentrated under the possibility of bomb attack. It means an almost calculated halt to the decentralization of industry south and west. It certainly means the old crowded, stagnant starving which has so long lain at the root of evils which richer regions have so loudly lamented in the South. It is even more certain that pressures which attend the spending of billions for the defense of democracy in the world seem to make even more difficult the hope of decency in democracy in the South.

BOOKS and the ARTS

THE YOUNG WRITERS OF AMERICA HISPANA*

BY EDUARDO MALLEA

Eduardo Mallea has succeeded in the difficult task of leading an active life in the journalism of his country without detriment to his growth as a profound proseman and novelist. In the complexity of his labors he resembles the first two contributors to this series—and many another important writer of a continent which, unlike ours, does not appear to sap the energies of its artists. Mallea was born in 1903 in Bahía Blanca, a town hundreds of miles south of Buenos Aires. He has been for years literary editor of the Sunday edition of *La Nación*; and, since its founding in 1931, the chief editorial lieutenant of Victoria Ocampo on *Sur*, the monthly literary journal which in the judgment of many is the finest published in the Western Hemisphere, if not—now that Europe has fallen—in the world.

Mallea's early stories ("La Ciudad Junto al Río Inmóvil") revealed an extraordinary temperament in despair before the vast inchoate world of Argentina; but already this mood creates an aesthetic form from the formlessness of the pampa. "Nocturno Europeo," "Historia de Una Pasión Argentina" indicate the artist's search for a forming principle in Argentinian life. The nationalism of these powerful essays must not be confused with that of the fascists—who did their best to win Mallea; or with the vague universalist nationalism of Walt Whitman. It is sharpened by social inquiry and by insistence upon a disciplined, differentiated vision of the individual. "Fiesta de Noviembre" (1938) is an extraordinary lyrical novel, revolutionary in its implications, in form a densely knit fugue.

Mallea's most recent book is a vast story of Buenos Aires, "La Bahía de Silencio" (1940). It is a sort of "Education sentimentale" that adapts technical innovations of Gide and Proust to the depiction of souls voided of even the refrains of European culture, souls at the dead end of the bourgeois process, desperately, passionately seeking to infuse the vast somnolent South American land with a new heroic spirit. Despite its magnificent prose and its superb character delineation, it is not in my judgment an aesthetic success—and could have been written only by a genius.—W. F.

THE most important and the gravest truth to emerge from a study of the panorama of Hispano-American literature is the lack of harmony within the literature itself. There is no unique Hispano-American mode, no unity of style or thought: diversity clutters the continental scene. A poet of Argentina appears as remote from a poet of Chile across the Andes as might a mind

of Chinese inspiration from a mind formed in Norway. This is not surprising to us who daily experience the divergences, spiritual and sociological, within the nations of the Hispano-American complex; but it is good to begin by stressing this very sharply before a reading public that has got in the habit of throwing all the lands from the Mexican Gulf to the Horn into one confused, agglutinated, undifferentiated lump.

America Hispana, first of all, is rich in differences. It's a body, and the organs of a body differ. It is a continent and a half that has been richer until now in distinctions than in integrations; and the reason is the definite tendency of its peoples to neglect the mutual exchange of common traits. We have ignored one another coldly—deliberately. Our sparse intellectual intercommunication has, until the present, confined itself largely to vague and courteous salutes about the most crudely visible values. What lives beneath these values, the essential ferments, the germination of the cells, we have passed over—with drums beating. Which is to say that we lack in the intellectual elements of our life the abundance and the particularity of data that we must have in order to form, of our artistic voices and of the latent directives in our ethic and aesthetic, the vast symphonic consciousness of our world.

The idea of difference comes not only from diversity, but even more from ignorance and non-knowledge. Nothing is more potentially different from me than an unknown person; yet nothing may be potentially more like me than an unknown person. Our mutual ignorance in America Hispana has been a guilty ignorance: a *privatio* of unity and of the will and destiny of unity; a sin against the possibility of greatness in those diverse living integers of our organism which, if they become conscious of the whole, are capable of functioning as a whole.

Therefore it will be clear that it is no simple adventure to classify and discuss the newest talents in countries lost to one another within our global America. Those very values of youth which are richest in potential may be the ones we do not know. Nevertheless, let us try to make some order, in speaking of the youngest writers of America Hispana.

Generally speaking, no art is chemically pure. All great art is a call. All authentic art has within it a message, be-

* This is the third of a series of articles on A New World Literature. The fourth and last, by Waldo Frank, will appear in an early issue.

that message a historical movement, a confession, or a prophecy. The great artist is the great witness: the relator, the accuser. If art is disconformity, if the life of artists is the endless history of inadaptability, this seeming negative is fecund because it mothers the will toward perfection. Let us confine ourselves therefore to the routes of some of the most significant messengers of artistic thought in these regions of America; omitting the names of many creators whose work, although objectively excellent, is fortuitous in character. America Hispana has large numbers of isolated poems, novels, tales, whose texture is fine, but whose accidental nature makes them unimportant to the organic action within the panorama, and it is this we wish to reveal. Avoiding both the static and the ecstatic movements of the Hispano-American soul, let us try to trace its dynamic movement.

A great new expression of poetry and a vigorous will for self-definition are the fertile currents upon which, like the woman swimmer of Propertius, the young soul of America Hispana is embarked. This fresh humanity sings intensely, and intensely declares unto itself its traits and its high destiny. Moved by the two deep passions of lyricism and intelligence, it does not find itself, does not care to relate itself, in the novel. Its truth means more to it than its fiction. And the novel of America Hispana remains inferior to the poem and the essay.

The great pride of the new America Hispana is its young poets. Their youth is not prematurity. Two Chileans, Pablo Neruda and Vicente Huidobro; three Argentines, Francisco Luis Bernárdez, Jorge Luis Borges, and Leopoldo Marechal; the Mexicans Xavier Villaurrutia and Bernardo Ortiz de Montellano, are voices as vigorous and as definitive as can be found at the head of any literature today. I name only the chiefs of a vast movement integrated by many excellent minor figures. The Spanish philologist, Amado Alonso, has just published a keen book on the poetry and style of Neruda, in which he extracts the deep and generous substance within the hermetic form of this great poet. Neruda of Chile is very distinct from Bernárdez or Marechal of Argentina; even as the inward life of the Chileans, imprisoned upon their narrow fringe of land between the Andes and the Pacific, is more poignant and desperately nostalgic than that of their neighbors. The Argentine is more solid and joyous by nature. Dweller on a soil which, with Brazil, constitutes the vastest and richest earth of all America Hispana, his song is more measured and more full. (I speak not of quality but of nature.) Yet the two voices—the one of Argentina serene and self-mastered, the one of Chile dolorous and tortured, compose a dense poetic concert which rises and floods the whole south continent from Magellan to Uruguay and Peru, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Huidobro and Neruda are tragic, nostalgic songs. Ber-

nárdez is all method, tradition, and geometry. His poem "El Buque" forms by itself a true province of Castilian poetry, a region of limpid airs, grave flora, godly soil, and severe, stripped horizons. In Jorge Luis Borges, the Creole strain achieves virile and poignant breadths. His song is noble, rich in the conquest of essences and forms, a new music of the most lordly colonial tradition and of the very substances of the Creoles. Utterly without emphasis or grandiloquence, it is the natural modern breath of seigniorial recollection. Leopoldo Marechal, like Bernárdez a Catholic and a religious poet, is more sensual, far more luxuriant in form; indeed, his first poems were daring odes inspired by Pan. As to the young Mexican poets, their *aflatus* appears to me to be more abstract, more poetically pure and less gravid of substance, as if they had been cultivated by culture itself; their anxieties are less Mexican than universal. They are superb translators; witness their fine renderings of T. S. Eliot and of other English poets; and they reach their most original heights perhaps in Villaurrutia and Ortiz de Montellano. An adolescent—scarcely more than a boy—heralds the dawn of a new, more humane poetry in Mexico: Octavio Paz. And among its leaders two Cuban poets must be named: Nicolas Guillén and Ballagás.

The joy and sorrow implicit in the real nature of the song of all these young men is not romantic. These are not mere lyric ecstasies, not the involved intonings of gratuitous and subjective states, as was so often the case—especially in Argentina and Chile—with these poets' immediate predecessors. The new song has the lyricism of an intensely serious preoccupation. It is not the first cry of a new world, not the free joyousness of birth and life; it is the discovery of the image of a mission and a fate. No, the new poetry is no intoxication timeless and unconditioned; it is the burdened, profound thinking of a vigil, the manly moderation of a dawn, the going forth to labor on a new day. It is the art of men who have already taken their destiny in their hands, to master it and to make it prevail.

Nor have we here, in consequence, a poetry after the manner of Walt Whitman. The new Hispano-American poetry is something far closer to its ideal; its future is no mere aspiration. Its future is already *today*—today pregnant. And therefore this song has a certain dominant severity. It is a poetry of the spirit, since it is a poetry of knowledge.

A similar preoccupation informs the new Hispano-American essay. To know and to define one's land and its men and women crowds out all other appetites. The language itself grows more pure, deprives itself, becomes almost white by force of will to be solely the instrument for a new intelligence of our own nature. There is a new man, a new natural creature, ethically and spiritually distinct; there is a new proportion between man and earth, capable of creating the style of an unknown culture.

America Hispana sets soberly to work to know what it is, and to say what it is.

One of the most revealing books of this modality, this new cognitive prose, is "Radiografía de la Pampa" by the Argentine Ezequiel Martínez Estrada. With Borges and Carlos Alberto Erro, Martínez Estrada heads in Argentina the new Hispano-American will of radical interpolation of the land. Four admirable young essayists of Cuba are, in a certain sense, despite their youth, the precursors of the entire movement: Juan Marinello, Jorge Mañach, Félix Lizaso, Jorge Ichaso. They are all continuators of José Martí, and have richly nourished with their discoveries and reflections the essential image of the Hispano-American peoples. (And the influence of the North American Waldo Frank upon all these consciences and intelligences will some day be extensively studied.)

What we have, then, in both the young essay and the young poem of America Hispana is *an inventory of consciousness*: the lucid and sometimes sullen act of a fresh generation which permits itself no rhetorical license, no literary adornments; which makes of its inspiration not a verbal parade but a deed. The essay, more and more, becomes testimony; more and more purifies itself of the romantic; grows less *virtuosic* and more *virtuous*, in the classic sense of this word, which includes also *valor*.

In his historical and spiritual vision, his command of events and lives, the mind of Martínez Estrada impresses me as the most mature among the essayists and critics of our America. (I exclude the more purely imaginative writers.) "Radiografía de la Pampa" is not an optimistic book. It is prolix, destructive, cold, and arid. Knowledge in it becomes a force leading to sterility, so pitilessly does it tear to shreds the body of the nation. It is an X-ray picture; and X-rays lend themselves to diagnosis rather than to love. But the pessimism of this remarkable book is really nothing but a gravity of conscience, a gravity neither ceremonial nor solemn, the gravity of a man who has been invaded by the life-breath of his people, sweeping away the gratuity, the cleverness, even the amenity, that belong only to individual souls with no work to do.

Thus, vastly swelling like a new-born river, a preoccupation that is neither morose nor inhibiting, a preoccupation fluid, swift, and fertile, sweeps in its course the soul of young America Hispana. Having already moved the essay and the poem, it begins, more tardily, to stir the novel. The novel is a culture form of maturity; therefore it has lingered in the subterranean sources of our world, requiring a germinal period far more prolonged than the essay and poem. But already here and there we see geysers of these underground currents; and in the past fifteen years a number of new, isolated, robust works of fiction have come up, all by young men.

Many of them reveal a deep social-revolutionary will.

There is, for instance, "Huasipungo," by Jorge Icaza, young and eminent novelist of Ecuador. The Chaco war has sown novelistic seed; novels of caliber have risen, like "El Infierno Verde" of the Central American, Marín Cañas, and "Sangre de Mestizos." The Venezuelan Uslar Pietri drinks at the epic source of his country's war of independence in "Las Lanzas Coloradas." The life of the boatmen of Peru inspired Ciro Alegria's "La Serpiente de Oro"; and the underworlds of Cuba are subjects of the vigorous short novels of Novas Calvo, and of "Contra-banda" by Enrique Sierpa, also a Cuban. The Mexican Mauricio Magdaleno, the Chilean Rubén Azócar are excellent new novelists; and María Luisa Bombal of Chile is mistress of a tragic and poetic vein which might be compared (there is no question of direct influence) with the brutal, delicious art of William Faulkner. In the young Argentine novel, I shall name only "El Juguetón Rabioso" and "Los Siete Locos" of Roberto Arlt, the tales of Borges, and "La Invención de Morel," in which Adolfo Bioy Cesares has made a little fantastic masterpiece in the field of the Stevensonian mystery story.

But consider the storhouse of virgin themes which is America—particularly America Hispana. Europe has exhausted the novelistic matter of every one of its geographic regions; perhaps also of every inward region of its men and women. Our continental world, on the contrary, is an immense state of mind and soul that still awaits its voice. Nevertheless, in power and breed the few novelists we have in America Hispana are not excelled anywhere in the world. A combination of the elemental with technical maturity makes the young novel of the United States—the narrative prose of a Faulkner, a Caldwell, a Hemingway—superior to the work of contemporary Europe. By the same token, there is something unique in the complex of an untouched nature and of an original human tone in the young fiction of America Hispana. A Mariano Azuela (of Mexico), a Jorge Icaza (of Ecuador) are worthy of the best secular literature.

What is needed in this young potent orchestration, today so expertly tuning up its excellent instruments? It must declare itself to be one; it must strike at one time into its authentic, implicit symphony. The notes are indeed beautiful. All that is required is that each shall know its neighbors and attune its sonority with the others so as to render and uphold the totality of voices. What is today anarchic song must impose upon itself a choral order. Pushkin and Dostoevski are a collaborated music; Dryden and Pope are a collaborated music. The essay of Martínez Estrada, the novel of Jorge Icaza are voices which, if modulated to the poems of Neruda and Borges and Bernárdez, will configure into the amazing, already wise will of a new world. There must come to the young inspiration of America Hispana the purpose to forge its future into an unprecedented day, against already twilight worlds.

A New Theory of Revolution

THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION. By James Burnham.
The John Day Company. \$2.50.

FOR some years now a theory has been growing, influenced by the increasing similarity of the communist and fascist states, of a new social order that is neither capitalism nor socialism, with a ruling class that is neither capitalist nor proletarian. A number of writers have helped to shape the theory. Among the radicals Max Nomad formulated it in a general way; he called the new rulers "intellectuals." Alfred Bingham made it more specific when he wrote that "the technical and managerial middle classes are slated to be next in the sequence of ruling classes." In my *Nation* articles on Marxism (February, 1940) I emphasized that the transformation of capitalism, so far, was bringing a new totalitarian order with a ruling class composed of "the technical, administrative, and managerial" groups in the new middle class who "perform the job of organizing and directing industry, which was the capitalist's job." Last fall a book appeared in England, "Marxism and Democracy," in which Lucien Laurat, a French Marxist, argued that all nations are moving beyond capitalism to a "controlled economy" with the new class of "bureau technicians" as rulers.

The first effort at a systematic elaboration of the theory, as far as I know, is James Burnham's book. It adds nothing new to the general theory, although he offers some interesting amplifications and confirmations. What Burnham has added, besides the name "managerial revolution," is two specific and related ideas: (1) Socialism is impossible; while capitalism is doomed, a "managerial society" will be its successor. (2) The "managers" who replace capitalists in the organization and direction of production *must* come to power in a totalitarian order that destroys democracy.

Burnham insists that "socialism is not possible of achievement or even of approximation." But "the results of the Russian experiment" he cites as proof simply prove misunderstanding and distortion of socialism. That "workers' committee control" of industry broke down does not mean, as Burnham contends, that socialism is impossible. It means that the Bolshevik idea was primitive and fantastic, for management is a functional job that must be performed by special functional groups; what is wrong in Russia is not that managers manage but that there is no economic or political democracy—including no free labor unions. Burnham, moreover, rules socialism impossible by defining its central feature as an absolute equality of income; any economic set-up, he argues, is not socialism but a system of exploitation "if one group receives a relatively larger share of the economy than another." But that definition fits only what Marx called "the higher stage of communism," of which Lenin wrote in 1917 that "it has never entered the head of any socialist to promise that the higher stage of communism will actually arrive." If socialism means no economic inequality at all, in the sense of differences in functional powers and income, I agree it is impossible. But, millennial conceptions aside, socialism ("the lower stage of communism") never meant more than a new order in which there is an end of capitalist privilege, planning of production for balance and plenty, and greater democracy.

But Burnham argues, and this is his most original idea, that the "managers" can come to power only in a totalitarian society, that this *may* "change into a democratic phase," but that "it would be an error for those who like democracy to be over-optimistic about it." What he does is simple: he projects the final "managerial" result of communism and fascism into all nations and into the future. The totalitarian tendency is converted into an absolute; a possibility becomes inevitable. Burnham is a determinist who makes the "managerial" theory a schematic, logical abstraction. But in society, as in nature, the same elements may combine in different ways to produce different results. Three major institutional elements are transforming capitalism: management, labor unions, and the state. Totalitarianism consists in the state seizing control of management and unions in a new combination of all economic and political power in the state. It is possible, however, for the three elements to combine in a different way: a constitutional set-up in which management, labor unions, and the state get definite but limited rights and powers over production in a democratic balance.

It is clear that we are moving beyond capitalism to a new economy: call it managerial, controlled, socialist. What is decisive is whether it is democratic or not. But for Burnham democracy is simply an ideology that rationalizes capitalist interests and power; the democratic principles of the Declaration of Independence, he says, are as much an ideology as Nazi racial doctrines. That is economic determinism gone mad. It forgets that an ideology may be judged by its social works: compare the works of a bestial racial doctrine with those of the Declaration! Medieval Christianity rationalized the feudal order, but its ideas helped to shape the democratic humanist values of the civilization that came after feudalism; the democratic procedures and values of capitalism go beyond capitalism to any desirable new order.

So Burnham concludes that the British workers are fighting for "democracy, that is, capitalism," and that growing Labor Party influence is meaningless because the unions are "capitalist." The New Deal is a "primitive" communism and fascism; according to Burnham, it must go totalitarian. He is blind to at least the possibility of an alternative development in the encouragingly suggestive upsurge of democracy and labor unionism under the New Deal. Since democracy cannot wage efficient war, says Burnham, a German victory is inevitable, with the emergence of three totalitarian powers: Germany, the United States, Japan. But if Germany is beaten, forces will be set in motion that offer a democratic alternative to totalitarian social change.

For there is an alternative, which Burnham nowhere explores, that allows for democratic "managerial" functional dominance. While there are totalitarian elements in the new middle class, the functional characteristics of its technical, managerial, and professional groups do not equal totalitarianism. Those characteristics include an interest in production, not in ownership and profit; the urge for workmanship evident in our technical-economic marvels and in the new art of industrial design; the scientific rational approach. The dominance of functional groups with such constructive characteristics is compatible with democracy; the characteristics are distorted or frustrated under totalitarianism. Technical managerial groups are not truly in power in the totalitarian

order but are a subordinate, if privileged, caste under control of "political élites" who want Caesarian adventures; worse off are the professional, educational, and other functional groups who are deprived of freedom. Totalitarianism is not a direct result of managerial dominance, as Burnham argues, but of a misunderstanding of the relation of middle class and workers, including management and labor unions, to a new order that makes social change an expression of mechanical pressures. Understanding and cooperation may bring democratic change.

Burnham insists he offers no program, no moral judgments. But his analyses and conclusions are a program of submission to a totalitarian doom against which man can do nothing. Burnham, formerly a Trotskyite, retains the deterministic absolutism that imprisons life in doctrinaire abstractions. The schematic Trotskyite revolution is replaced with an equally schematic "managerial revolution" that tells the totalitarian élites, with "scientific objectivity," that their triumph is inevitable. It is the Olympian decadatism of a doctrinaire radical gone sour.

LEWIS COREY

Essays by MacLeish

THE AMERICAN CAUSE. By Archibald MacLeish, Duell, Sloan, and Pearce. \$1.

A TIME TO SPEAK: THE SELECTED PROSE OF ARCHIBALD MACLEISH. Houghton Mifflin Company. \$2.75.

THE smaller of these two collections of MacLeish's essays contains but two pieces. The first is a lyrical appreciation of America which seems slightly extravagant. "Americans . . . were the first self-constituted, self-declared, self-created people in the history of the world." They had the luck to be born "on this continent, where the heat was hotter and the cold was colder, and the sun was brighter and the nights were blacker, and the distances were farther and the faces were nearer, and the rain was more like rain than anywhere else on earth." The second essay, on American Mobilization, is a wholly admirable plea for an affirmative rather than defensive attitude toward the democratic cause, for a "mobilization of a people to defend themselves against attack not by interrupting their life as a people but by fulfilling their life as a people."

The second collection covers the whole range of MacLeish's interests. His preoccupations as poet and artist are represented by several essays in which he defines his conception of the relation of art to life. For him "poetry is not ornament, is not flowers, is not pumping up of language with metaphors . . . is not a paint, an enamel, a veneer. Poetry . . . is revelation, is discovery. Its essence is precision, but precision of the emotions not of the mind. Its quality is to illuminate from within, not from without." The first essay in the larger volume is an eloquent attack upon those "who tell us poetry is 'pure.'" He wants to "bury those with High Standards. (The impotent have High Standards; the begetters beget.)" There seems to be a shift in emphasis, though not necessarily an inconsistency, between his position in 1934, when he draws a sharp distinction between the man "who serves an art and the man who serves a cause" and criticizes those who "escape into the security of a movement"

from the "lonely and difficult" practice of an art, and the position he takes in the now famous essay on "the Irresponsibles." Here he inveighs against those who "emerged free, pure, and single into the antiseptic air of objectivity."

It is probably too late either to praise the general purpose of this much-debated essay or to criticize incidental details. He is certainly right in his general attack upon the cult of objectivity, impartiality, and neutrality in our liberal culture which helped to bring the democratic cause so close to disaster. But the cause to which he attributes this false idea of impartiality is hardly convincing. He ascribes it to "the division and therefore the destruction of intellectual responsibility. The men of intellectual duty, those who should have been responsible for action, have divided themselves into two castes, two cults, the scholars and the writers. Neither accepts responsibility for the common culture or its defense." The hope of achieving scientific and rational objectivity in the field of social thought has profounder roots than any real or fancied specialization of function among intellectuals. The fact is that the whole structure of modern culture is reared upon the false assumption that such dispassionate objectivity is either possible or desirable.

Perhaps MacLeish's most significant contribution to the thought of our time lies in his stout defense of the democratic cause. To this task he brings not only his gifts as a poet but the not inconsiderable equipment of a social philosopher. He understands the spiritual weapons of fascism and the spiritual weaknesses of our culture which these weapons penetrate. He knows that the defense of democracy cannot be a defense of the status quo if the fight is to be successful. He pays his respect to "the diplomat who tells us that democracy is dead in England, meaning by democracy . . . a chance to make ten millions in the market." He scorns a united front against fascism which includes "the Chicago Tribune and Mr. Ickes . . . the people who pay income taxes and the people who don't pay income taxes." All this is sound doctrine, derived from a genuine passion for democracy and understanding of its essence.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Mountain Farm

I BOUGHT A MOUNTAIN. By Thomas Firbank. Guilford, Vermont: The Countryman Press. \$2.75.

WE HAVE recently had plenty of professional writers who have become amateur farmers and succeeded in reaping at least a literary harvest. But here we have a young man who, after a brief experience of urban industry, decided to make a career on the land. He put all his capital into a sheep farm on a Welsh mountain and sweated for seven years until he had learned his job and had every right to call himself a professional farmer. Then, somehow, in the intervals of lambing, dipping, shearing, hay-making, and gathering the flocks he managed to distill his experiences into a book about which there is nothing amateurish. Mr. Firbank's pictures of his grim yet glorious Welsh hills will arouse the nostalgia of any mountain addict. But still better are his accounts of the lives, characters, and conversations of his Welsh neighbors. They are grand, genuine folk, though more than a little suspicious of "foreigners," and it speaks

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volumes for the author as a man that despite his totally different background he has been so fully accepted into their community. Mr. Firbank at times grows eloquent about his public life, but he does not gloss over its risks and hardships. Always he writes with gusto and humor, and there is about his book an earthy smell that any reader with a rural upbringing will recognize as the real thing.

KEITH HUTCHISON

From Allah to Ataturk

TURKEY. By Emil Lengyel. Random House. \$3.75.

PERHAPS never since the walls of Vienna resisted Suleiman the Magnificent has general interest been so intensely focused on Turkey as now. The general public is interested in knowing what resistance Turkey may offer to the onslaught of the ruthless heathens, this time coming from the West; the sociologist seeks the causes underlying what seems the miraculously sudden transformation of a religious community into a modern national state.

In spite of its manifold merits Emil Lengyel's work does not give a clear-cut answer to these questions. It is, however, extremely comprehensive, offering an ethnographic survey of the Turks, an analysis of Mohammedanism, and a history of the Ottoman Empire and of the birth throes of the Turkish Republic.

Attempts to modernize Turkey preceded the post-war metamorphosis of an ultra-conservative, religious despotism into a "streamlined" modern country. Midhat Pasha, the originator of the short-lived constitution, bitterly complained: "Nous envoyons nos jeunes gens à Paris pour être civilisé et ils retournent syphilisé." Some forty years ago an *Osmanli*, a citizen of the Ottoman Empire, considered it an insult to be called Turk, and even when the so-called revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 provoked, as Lengyel calls it, "the *Tanzimat* movement of delirious nationalism," its utopian expectations did not materialize. During World War I a Turkish friend with whom I was walking in Stamboul pointed to two buildings, one of which was the tomb of Sultan Ahmed, the other the Ministry of Public Instruction, and remarked: "These are both tombs: in one a Sultan, in the other education, is buried."

All the more astonishing is the almost unanimous recognition of the value of the reforms with which Ataturk Kemal must be credited. Lengyel gives a vivid description of the energy with which "the Father of the Turks" discarded the vez and the veil, changed the alphabet, organized education, started the breaking up of large estates, set up basic production industries, and substituted a modern judicial system for religious jurisdiction. "Few revolutions," says Mr. Lengyel, "have done away with as many old taboos or have created as many new values." However, Lengyel succeeds no better in explaining this "great miracle of the East" than did Donald Webster or Jarman Leckie or John Parker. Not even Hans Kohn's answer, that Kemal knew "how to give constructive direction to progressive forces," is entirely satisfactory.

No matter how and why the new Turkey was born, there is a more alarming question: How is it going to stand the

test of the new world conflagration? In the maze of this problem Lengyel's work will prove a most useful guide-book. It offers not merely bountiful factual information but an illuminating insight into the Oriental mind. We may disagree with some of the author's statements, for instance, his description of the Turk as an "eternal nomad"—the land-owning Anatolian peasant is no more nomad than his Bulgarian and Hungarian racial brother; we may object to inaccuracies, as for example, the statement that the Turk built nothing, no churches, no public baths, though the author himself has probably used the Budapest Rudasfuerde built by the Turks four hundred years ago; but his book reflects assiduous research and his colorful language matches the subject matter.

RUSTEM VAMBERY

Published This Week

UNITED WE STAND! DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. By Hanson W. Baldwin. Whittlesey House. \$3.

A GREAT EXPERIMENT. An Autobiography by Viscount Cecil. Oxford. \$3.50.

FRANCE SPEAKING. By Robert de Saint Jean. Dutton. \$2.50.

THE TELEPHONE IN A CHANGING WORLD. By Marion May Dilts. Longmans, Green. \$2.50.

TOUGHEN UP, AMERICA! By Victor G. Heiser, M. D. Whittlesey House. \$2.

A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRIC ACHIEVEMENT, WITH A FORECAST FOR THE FUTURE. By Nolan D. C. Lewis, M. D. Norton. \$3.

THE WILD SEVENTIES. By Denis Tilden Lynch. Appleton-Century. \$5.

THE SHADOW OF THE HAWK. By Evelyn Scott. Scribner's \$2.75.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL. United States Information Service. 75 cents.

THE WRITINGS OF MARGARET FULLER. Selected and Edited by Mason Wade. Viking. \$5.

SEMANTICS. By Hugh Walpole. Norton. \$2.50.

BATTLE FOR THE WORLD. The Strategy and Diplomacy of the Second World War. Modern Age Books. \$3.

EVERYONE'S CHILDREN, NOBODY'S CHILD. A Judge Looks at Underprivileged Children in the United States. By Justine Wise Polier. Scribner's. \$2.75.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCIENCES. Second Series. Edited by L. L. Woodruff. Yale. \$3.

ARE our newspapers truly free?—free of financial pressure, advertising influence, and the wire-pulling of organized minorities? Twenty-eight of the nation's leading newspaper publishers, editors, and columnists debate this problem in

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Vanguard, N. Y. C.

IN BRIEF

A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO PUBLIC HOUSING. By Catherine Bauer. Vassar College. 60 cents.

This is a first-rate presentation of the housing picture, both generally accepted facts and pertinent questions, as it looks to an experienced worker in the field. The illustrations, too, are excellent.

MY COUNTRY 'TIS OF THEE. By Lucy Sprague Mitchell, Eleanor Bowman, and Mary Phelps. The Macmillan Company. \$3.50.

It is hard to see how these three women could have done a better job. In telling the story of the use and abuse of our natural resources they combine broad knowledge and clear thinking with vivid presentation. They aren't afraid to take any bull by the horns, even though he is very much alive and an honorable member of the board of the Metropolitan Opera. Some readers might find this book rather on the primer side. But most people can learn a great deal from it and will have fun doing so.

MEN OF THE MOUNTAINS. By Jesse Stuart. E. P. Dutton and Company. \$2.50.

A collection of twenty-one corking good stories about the reckless mountain boys and girls and their old folks: working, loving, feuding, electioneering, "shouting" at camp meeting. Fresh and breezy, chockful of Kentucky hill-folk's lore and good humor, they are among Mr. Stuart's best creations, and he is at his best in the short story.

FILMS

Iconoclast in Hollywood

Hollywood, April 18

"CITIZEN KANE" has probably had more advance publicity of one kind or another than any other picture yet produced. Practically everybody connected with the production has been reported on the verge of a lawsuit. Some have said that all this uproar was nothing but exceptionally well-handled publicity, while others have sworn that William Randolph Hearst was determined to prevent the picture's release. Finally it was announced that the picture would definitely be released in the near future, and the press assembled at last week's preview in a state of great expectancy.

Many would probably have rejoiced to find producer, director, actor, and part-author Orson Welles's ambitious first effort in Hollywood not an unqualified success: after all, the man had had no previous cinema experience, and if reports were true he had walked into the studio and produced on a very low budget a film which was a masterpiece.

It must be stated here that no amount of advance publicity or ballyhoo could possibly ruin the effect of this remarkable picture. It is probably the most original, exciting, and entertaining picture that has yet been produced in this country, and although it may lack their subtlety it can certainly be placed in the same bracket as the very best pre-war French productions.

The film may not have been inspired by the life of William Randolph Hearst, but the story of Charles Foster Kane, as unfolded in the picture, certainly bears a remarkable resemblance to Hearst's career. The incident concerning the Spanish-American War, the vast collection of useless antiques acquired by Kane, and certain details such as the picnic, with the guests compelled to spend the night under canvas, are familiar parts of the Hearst legend; and the castle of Xanadu, Kane's retreat from the world, with its endless acres and private zoo, is more than reminiscent of San Simeon. If Mr. Hearst decides, as many others undoubtedly will, that the film is only the most thinly disguised version of his life story, he will perhaps be favorably impressed with the sympathy and understanding with which the subject has been treated, and may even be delighted to have provided material for a drama of almost classical proportions.

The film opens with the death of Kane, a very old man, alone in the colossal, ugly monument to his wealth and power—Xanadu. A sort of March of Time dealing with Kane's life is then presented. The producers of this short are dissatisfied, finding it too superficial and impersonal, and are determined to obtain more intimate details of the man's personal history. The remainder of the picture deals with the information on Kane's life and character obtained respectively from his guardian, his chief assistant, a dramatic critic who was once his best friend, his second wife, and his butler. This technique of unfolding the story necessitates five separate flashbacks and creates a certain amount of confusion which is more than compensated for by the powerful effect obtained by the gradual illumination of

character, until with the click of the final switch he is fully revealed—empty, lonely, and unhappy, a victim of his own personal power.

This excellent cinematic material Welles has embellished with brilliant directorial, pictorial, and dramatic touches. He breaks, with the greatest effect, practically every photographic rule in the business, employing very few close-ups, playing whole scenes with the faces of the performers in shadow, using lighting to enhance the dramatic value of the scene rather than the personal appearance of the actor. He is, in fact, one of the first Hollywood directors really to exploit the screen as a medium, and it is interesting to note that in doing this he has used an entire cast with no previous screen experience.

The acting both of Welles and of the rest of the Mercury Theater cast is excellent. Dorothy Comingore as Kane's second wife, whom he forces to sing in opera to gratify his ego, is particularly effective; so is Joseph Cotten as the dramatic critic. Welles himself gives an amazing performance as Kane, equally convincing in youth, middle age, and senility. The photographer, Gregg Toland, has achieved some wonderful effects, particularly the scene in the projection room of the newsreel company.

The picture has made a tremendous impression in Hollywood. Charlie Chaplin is reported to be prepared to back any venture that Welles may have in mind. Perhaps when the uproar has died down it will be discovered that the film is not quite so good as it is considered now, but nevertheless Hollywood will for a long time be in debt to Mr. Welles.

OTHER FILMS

"The Great Lie" is one of those exasperating pictures which a few moments of sensible conversation between the chief characters would bring to a hasty stop, almost before it started. Even Bette Davis is unable to carry off with conviction the part of Maggie, a Southern belle of the modern era. Mary Astor walks away with the histrionic honors as a pianist with style and a sharp tongue, and the picture is really quite lively when she is around.

To criticize "Men of Boys' Town" seems almost churlish when it is a picture of such excellent intentions. A sequel to "Boys' Town," it gives further publicity to Father Flanagan, whose work with juvenile delinquents is well known, and throws in an exposure of the brutal conditions in a reform school highly reminiscent of the unsavory ex-

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poses at the recent Whittier School investigations. Nevertheless, it must be said that the creators of this picture have gone a little too far in their employment of sentimental devices. Nothing is spared—the death and burial of a little dog, at least three agonized partings, gobs of human kindness, and a minor miracle. Spencer Tracy as Father Flanagan wears his halo with some skill, and Mickey Rooney makes another contribution to Americana with his performance as the mayor of Boys' Town.

The screen play of "Ziegfeld Girl" appears somewhat dusty with age. Nearly everything that has ever been said before about life behind the footlights and the dangers of the dressing-room is said again with the monotony born of repetition. The impressive array of stars featured in this picture are helpless against the odds, and Lana Turner, Hedy Lamarr, and Judy Garland wander round like lost souls on the gigantic Ziegfeld staircases. James Stewart makes a half-hearted appearance as a truck driver, a number of pretty girls parade in hideous costumes, and the only spark of life is kindled by two brilliant Spanish dancers called Rosario and Antonio. The film should make Ziegfeld turn in his grave.

ANTHONY BOWER

RECORDS

A GERMAN musician I know who in true German fashion cannot discuss a mere performance without tying it up with vast historico-philosophical notions, sometimes with interesting results, sometimes with preposterous ones, made one of his less pretentious and more penetrating—that is to say, less speculative and more factual—observations recently when I spoke of the excellence of Bruno Walter's performances of "Fidelio" and "Don Giovanni." "That," he explained, "is because Walter is a rhetorical nature." And it is true that the difference between Toscanini's performance of Beethoven's "Eroica" with the N. B. C. Symphony (Victor Set 765, \$7) and Walter's with the New York Philharmonic-Symphony (Columbia Set 449, \$6.50) is the difference between fierce, concentrated intensity and expansive rhetoric. For a while I followed and accepted appreciatively the different shapes in sound, the different effects, which the different personal and musical natures of the two conductors were giving to the work; but at the beginning of the third side Walter's treatment of the passage for solo horn

and then for solo flute caused me to think of a remark ascribed to Toscanini himself a few years ago: "At something beautiful Walter melts. I suffer." Walter's melting over that passage for solo horn and solo flute was the first of the details that I found too expansively rhetorical for my own nature and my own feeling about this work.

After the thin, dry, hard Studio 8H sound of the Toscanini recording the sonority and depth and voluminousness of the Walter recording were even more impressive than they would have been merely after some of Columbia's previous recordings of orchestra. Noting this vast improvement I was aware, after a minute or two, that the sound did not have the beautiful warmth and clean transparency and clarity of definition of Columbia's imported Beecham recordings; and after a while the cleanliness and sharpness of the Victor Studio 8H recording were as much a relief after the amorphous voluminousness of the Columbia recording as the cleanliness and sharpness of Toscanini's performance itself were after the amorphous voluminousness of Walter's. All this, moreover, was when I played the Walter recording with only a little less than the widest frequency-range of my Scott; and when I reduced the range to what I used for the Toscanini recording—which is what I use for the Columbia Beechams, the Victor Stokowskis, and what one is likely to have on a good machine—the recording lost brilliance on top and became muffled and hollow in the middle; whereas the Toscanini recording retained its balance and clarity even on an eight-tube Lafayette of limited frequency-range, on which the Walter recording sounded muffled throughout.

As for Victor's other orchestral releases, the unfamiliar Mozart Sinfonia Concertante K. App. No. 9 recorded by Stokowski and the Philadelphia Orchestra (Set 760, \$4.50) turns out to be—for my ears, at any rate—one of the duller exercises of Mozart's willing craftsmanship. The beautiful playing of the soloists is recorded with marvelous fidelity; but Stokowski's delicately perfumed phrasing of Mozart is—to my ears, again—as unacceptable as his more violently luxuriant treatment of Bach and Mussorgsky; and from a man who has consistently given us astoundingly beautiful orchestral recording it is a surprise to get the piercingly harsh sound of the violins, the occasional wooden sound of the entire orchestra on these records. A single disc (17731, \$1) offers harsh recording of harsh performances of Rimsky-Korsakov's "Doubushka" and Glinka's Overture to "Ruslan and Ludmilla" by Sevitzky and the Indianapolis Symphony; and on another single (13590, \$1) Sevitzky conducts the Philadelphia Chamber String Sinfonietta in more sensitive and more agreeably recorded performances of some not too interesting music by Grétry—a Pantomime, and two pieces from the opera "Denys le tyran."

The New Friends of Music concert at which Stridley conducted his own orchestral version of Bach's "Art of Fugue" offered the deeply satisfying experience of magnificent music well performed—so satisfying as to cause the audience to cheer at the end. There were satisfying experiences at some of the other concerts—the old music sung by Tinayre, the performance of the delightful Haydn Symphony No. 67; and on the other hand there was Serkin's mediocre playing in Mozart's Concerto K. 453. This rarely heard work is a masterpiece; the three unfamiliar pieces that Milstein played were a bore—instead of which he might have played the neglected Concerto K. 216, which is delightful; and this was only one of several instances of the tendency I have pointed out occasionally in New Friends program-making. As for the performances, Stridley is evidently a musically and technically accomplished conductor, but also a somewhat tense one who at times—to judge from the wiry sound—imparts his tenseness to the orchestra, instead of creating the relaxed ease that shows itself, in things like silken, luminous string tone. The wiry sound is noticeable also when he pulls the orchestra up short in the way a rider does with a horse, and with a similar result—the breaking of the easy flow in the music and in the playing, which it is the conductor's job to create and maintain.

This flow is something that Beecham—whom some of the thoroughly trained Germans are inclined to dismiss as a mere dilettante—achieves; it is the thing which caused the New York City Symphony to play with fine sonority at his first concert and with almost perfect precision at his second; it is one of the things that make him one of the world's great conductors. And the man who phrased Mozart's Symphony K. 297 so powerfully, who lifted the long opening melody of the slow movement of Haydn's Symphony No. 102 from point to point of increasing tension so excitingly, is one of the world's great musicians.

B. H. HAGGIN

Letters to the Editors

Blackmail by Business

Dear Sirs: We can't keep our democracy by creating an anti-labor attitude. An anti-labor attitude is anti-democracy and the surest way to destroy the democracy everyone seems so bent on saving today.

Many harsh words are being spoken about labor in defense industries. Why is so little said about the reasons for these strikes? The press often gives the impression that the whole fault lies with the workmen, and I am sure this is not true. We need honest and full reporting today more than ever, and we don't get it when facts on labor's side of the story are omitted.

A recent Town Hall radio program in New York brought out the fact that in the Allis-Chalmers strike workers were ready to accept the terms of the government board but the management of Allis-Chalmers refused. Because of this refusal on the part of management the strike was continued. Yet nothing of this was told in the news reports on the strike. Is the press carrying on a campaign to influence the public against labor?

The April, 1941, issue of *Economic Notes* quotes from "Economic Power and Political Pressures" released by the Temporary National Economic Committee on March 15, as follows:

Speaking bluntly, the government and the public are "over the barrel" when it comes to dealing with business in time of war or other crisis. Business refuses to work except on terms which it dictates. It controls the natural resources, the liquid assets, the strategic position in the country's economic structure, and its technical equipment and knowledge of processes. The experience of the World War, now apparently being repeated, indicates that business will use this control only if it is "paid properly." In effect, this is blackmail, not too fully disguised.

This shows us plainly enough that industry rather than labor deserves public censure.

RUTH E. HILL
Jamesville, N. Y., April 16

Tom Wintringham Writes

Dear Sirs: The following is an excerpt from a letter from Tom Wintringham, who, as many *Nation* readers know, fought with the Loyalists in Spain and, more recently, helped train the British Home Guard. It gives, I feel, a glimpse

of what is going on in the minds of some Englishmen:

. . . The main line we are taking is this: that this war is not yet an anti-fascist war but can be made so if anti-fascists will show that they are better at all necessary jobs than the imperialists. Also because the imperialists are losing the war and plenty of people want to win it. Let us know whether there are any signs of a similar line in the United States. Over here we only hear of the Wall Street imperialist line and some plain pacifist isolationism—nothing that sounds like the real democracy we fought for in Spain with the possible exception of this man Reuther and the C. I. O. plan for airplanes. We should be grateful for any stuff on these lines which you could send us.

MILLY BENNETT
Yuba City, Cal., April 15

Workers' Democracy

Dear Sirs: You and your writers seem to have an uneasy conviction that all is not well with the sentiments of the worker, with the feeling for "democracy" of the vast, inarticulate, producing mass of the population. You seem to be trying to convince them that your interests are also their interests, that it would be well for them to fight and die for the concepts that you and your kind hold most dear.

I should think that the very fact that you feel it necessary to convince people that they should defend your concept of democracy is sufficient proof that all is by no means well with the state of that democracy. I will agree that your fears are well founded. The sentiments that I hear expressed among the men I work with would give you much more cause for fear.

The bitter struggle for existence over the past ten years has not convinced us that a future of the same essential difficulty and even despair is at all worth the terrific battle that you seem to feel is needful to maintain it. Those of us who have lost our homes, who have been forced to fight for poor relief, who have been and still are forced to fight for the recognition of our unions, and for the few pennies that keep us alive, do not feel that we can be much worse under any particular system of society. When houses are needed, we shall still have to build them, and we shall have to be fed and clothed while we produce them. Even fascism must feed us, for after all

is said and done, we are indispensable under capitalism, fascism, or communism. We get no more than a living now; no one can give us less, and under our present system no one wants to give us more.

I think therefore that it behoves us to fight for what we know to be our own interest, and to take every opportunity to advance that interest, no matter what the international situation may be. That interest would seem to dictate that we should be prepared to fight to keep fascism, both native and foreign, from dominating our country; it does not mean that we must fight to defend the British Empire. That interest seems to demand that we must beware of all who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo in these United States and in the world in general.

Harold Laski is probably the only man among you who sees fairly clearly the imperatives of the new order from the workers' point of view. History will be written in blood and fire by those who are able to understand that the common people of every country today demand more than promises. They demand security, decent living, a voice in their own affairs, and at least a prospect of a more generous future, and they don't particularly care whether you would call it democracy or not.

W. L. ROSS, Bricklayer
Whitestone, N. Y., April 17

Puzzled by America

Dear Sirs: Old World professors whom Hitler & Co. dislodged sometimes want to teach *Kultur* to the backward natives of this country. Although I am a teacher, I, like all unprejudiced professors, would rather learn myself. Before all, I would attempt to understand the American background. Yet I confess I am often puzzled at things I read or hear.

I suppose most citizens of the United States are good Americans. This implies respect for valuable traditions which are part of the national inheritance. Not long ago I saw a full-page advertisement reproducing the Gettysburg Address captioned, "What can a man believe in?" Next to it was the picture of a commercial product "you can believe in." Does it not hurt American taste to see one of the finest speeches of mankind so desecrated?

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Apparently even less reverence is due to live Presidents than to the dead ones. Almost two years ago I saw a cartoon in one of the leading dailies picturing dead American soldiers on a European battlefield. It was captioned "The Price of a Third Term."

I read and hear every day that in order to attain his aims Mr. Roosevelt wants to establish a dictatorship. Do these accusers pretend to say that Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler were elected by overwhelming majorities? Were the March on Rome and the Reichstag fire equivalents of the free discussion by which the Congress decides questions of foreign policy? Or is this charge perhaps a hint that neither the Congress nor the electorate is competent?

Democracy means, among other things, that all men are born free and equal. There are no dukes and counts, no barons and lords in this country. Why then this fuss in the newspapers about princes and other aristocrats? Some time ago I read a newspaper report of the views of a young American student on foreign policy. Young men may be extremely gifted, but they are often lacking in the knowledge and experience which would make their opinion on foreign policy worth quoting. This particular young man happened to be the son of an American ex-ambassador. But if the sons of ambassadors inherit the abilities of their progenitors, why should this country not have dukes and counts?

Recently people were insisting in the press and in public addresses on being told how many guns, planes, tanks, etc., the United States has. You cannot catch a sparrow with a drum, as the Hungarian proverb has it. Democracy or dictatorship, there is no country which does not keep its armaments as secret as possible. These indiscreet inquirers may be bona fide Americans who dislike the ways and means of the "totalitarian" countries. But if so, why do they use their idiom? Why do journalists and radio commentators call a lightning war a

Blitzkrieg and the air force, if it happens to be German, *Luftwaffe*? Foreign terms are acceptable only if they cannot be translated. And it is absurd to refer to Virginio Gayda as the "mouthpiece" of Il Duce or to the *Völkischer Beobachter* as the semi-official paper of the Führer—as if any paper in Germany or Italy could be anything but a mouthpiece.

RUSTEM VAMBERY

New York, April 4

Summer School in Chile

Dear Sirs: On June 28 a group of students and teachers under the auspices of the Institute of International Education will sail for Chile to attend a four weeks' summer school in Santiago. This trip will offer not only fine courses, opportunities to make friends with Chileans, and skiing excursions in the Andes, but also a chance to observe special festivals celebrating the 400th anniversary of the founding of Santiago.

The Institute of International Education is developing a program to permit groups of North Americans and Latin Americans to visit each other's countries and take special brief courses. Last year fifty-four North Americans attended summer school at the University of San Marcos, in Lima, Peru; the school will be repeated this year. From January to March, 1941, a group of 110 Latin Americans from seven different countries took special courses at the University of North Carolina, and twenty-five Chileans were enrolled in brief courses at Columbia University. It is hoped that next year still more groups will be organized for study in the States and Latin America.

The all-expense tour, including passage on the Chilean Line and the four weeks' stay in Santiago, will amount to only \$400. For those who would like to make a circle tour of South America, sailing from New York on June 6 or from New Orleans on June 13 and visiting the east coast of South America be-

fore commencing courses in Santiago, the price will be about \$200 additional. For further information, write to the Institute of International Education, 2 West 45th Street, New York City.

DOROTHY M. FEITH,
Assistant Secretary,
Latin American Division
New York, April 15

CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT W. BARNETT has just returned from a six months' trip of observation in Central China. He is a member of the research staff of the Institute of Pacific Relations and is the author of a forthcoming book, "Economic Shanghai: Hostage to Politics."

W. E. LUCAS, until recently, was correspondent for the London *Times* in Portugal. Before the war he issued in England a weekly news letter called "Fleet Street Letter."

DALE KRAMER has contributed to *Harper's*, *Survey Graphic*, and other magazines. He is now completing a novel, to be called "The Pitchfork Rebellion," dealing with the farm rising in the early 1930's.

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